From a226a3830c70443d040dd8db3a49daa2d56abf3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trolli Schmittlauch Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 13:26:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fix grammar flaw --- paper_hashtag_federation.pdf | 2 +- paper_hashtag_federation.tex | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/paper_hashtag_federation.pdf b/paper_hashtag_federation.pdf index 48e0ad7..b493420 100644 --- a/paper_hashtag_federation.pdf +++ b/paper_hashtag_federation.pdf @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 -oid sha256:f7c72e04251a32d2531ea898ead435bec8ec9bfe10ad56b167f49f0c9d68cb46 +oid sha256:34a34113d4e31ad7188e5c6e07d99b0dff93f372eecec2eed7181e3d0a652640 size 2920699 diff --git a/paper_hashtag_federation.tex b/paper_hashtag_federation.tex index 442b55c..54abbf1 100644 --- a/paper_hashtag_federation.tex +++ b/paper_hashtag_federation.tex @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ The large difference in overloaded nodes clearly shows that the k-choices load b Adding hashtag federation to federated social network using this proposed system in most cases does not raise any serious privacy concerns: Only public posts are handled by the system, and as only the URI from where a post can be fetched is relayed to subscribers the originating instance can choose to stop providing that post at any time. Instances subscribe to tags on behalf of their users, they hide the interests of particular users unless the set of active users on the particular instance is too small. -While \ac{DHT} networks provide an efficient way of structuring a \ac{P2P} lookup network with only knowing a small subset of its nodes and no central authority, exactly these missing global view and lack of central trust anchor pose several security challenges. +While \ac{DHT} networks provide an efficient way of structuring a \ac{P2P} lookup network with only knowing a small subset of its nodes and no central authority, exactly this missing global view and lack of central trust anchor poses several security challenges. Urdaneta et al. \cite{urdanetaSurveyDHTSecurity2011} provide a broad survey of common security threats in \ac{DHT} security and attempts of solving them. \\ \textbf{Routing attacks} try to alter or disrupt the routing process within a \ac{DHT} to prevent the resolution of keys, let them point to invalid nodes or even to relay the combined lookup requests on a popular ID to a third party server as a Distributed \ac{DoS}. Storage attacks attempt to alter or forge the stored payload data returned under a key by impersonating the responsible node or taking over the relevant key space.