Trolli Schmittlauch
4cc3b104cc
- add some citations to indtroduction - attempt to make clear what judgements come from the papers and which from me
578 lines
38 KiB
BibTeX
578 lines
38 KiB
BibTeX
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1332017,
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title = {{{ETSI TS}} 133 185 {{V14}}.0.0; {{LTE}}; {{5G}}; {{Security}} Aspect for {{LTE}} Support of {{Vehicle}}-to-{{Everything}} ({{V2X}}) Services ({{3GPP TS}} 33.185 Version 14.0.0 {{Release}} 14)},
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lccn = {DTS/TSGS-0333185ve00},
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language = {English},
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publisher = {{ETSI}},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = jul,
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year = {2017},
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keywords = {standards,unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/QZ9J6QPR/ts_133185v140000p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{3GPPTS23,
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title = {{{3GPP TS}} 23.285 {{V15}}.0.0 \textendash{} {{Architecture}} Enhancements for {{V2X}} Services},
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lccn = {3GPP TS 23.285 V15.0.0},
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keywords = {standards,unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/EVPKU3QU/3GPP TS 23.285 V15.0.0 – Architecture enhancements.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012,
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title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 941 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Trust}} and {{Privacy Management}}},
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lccn = {ETSI \textendash{} TS 102 941},
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publisher = {{ETSI}},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = jun,
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year = {2012},
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keywords = {standards,unread,pseudonyms},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/QTWZ48M8/ts_102941v010101p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI3026652010,
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title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 665 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Communicatons Architecture}}},
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lccn = {EN 302 665},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = sep,
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year = {2010},
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keywords = {standards,unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/JRA3LKUZ/en_302665v010101p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{StudyArchitectureEnhancements,
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title = {Study on Architecture Enhancements for {{LTE}} Support of {{V2X}} Services ({{Release}} 14)},
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lccn = {3GPP TR 23.785 V14.0.0},
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publisher = {{3GPP}},
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keywords = {standards,unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/HYALN4ND/Study on architecture enhancements for LTE support.pdf}
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}
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@misc{StudySecurityAspects,
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title = {Study on Security Aspects for {{LTE}} Support of {{Vehilce}}-to-{{Everythine}} ({{V2X}}) Services ({{Release}} 14)},
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lccn = {TR 33.885},
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publisher = {{3GPP}},
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keywords = {standards,unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/AZ7R6325/Study on security aspects for LTE support of Vehil.pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{angermeierPALPrivacyAugmented2013,
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title = {{{PAL}} - {{Privacy}} Augmented {{LTE}}: {{A}} Privacy-Preserving Scheme for Vehicular {{LTE}} Communication},
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author = {Angermeier, Daniel and Kiening, Alexander and Stumpf, Frederic},
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month = jun,
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year = {2013},
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keywords = {unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/T5AAP6NL/Angermeier et al. - 2013 - PAL - Privacy augmented LTE A privacy-preserving .pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{schaubVtokensConditionalPseudonymity2010,
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title = {V-Tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in {{VANETs}}},
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doi = {10.1109/WCNC.2010.5506126},
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abstract = {Privacy is an important requirement in vehicle networks, because vehicles broadcast detailed location information. Also of importance is accountability due to safety critical applications. Conditional pseudonymity, i.e., usage of resolvable pseudonyms, is a common approach to address both. Often, resolvability of pseudonyms is achieved by authorities maintaining pseudonym- identity mappings. However, these mappings are privacy sensitive and require strong protection to prevent abuse or leakage. We present a new approach that does not rely on pseudonym-identity mappings to be stored by any party. Resolution information is directly embedded in pseudonyms and can only be accessed when multiple authorities cooperate. Our privacy-preserving pseudonym issuance protocol ensures that pseudonyms contain valid resolution information but prevents issuing authorities from creating pseudonym-identity mappings.},
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author = {Schaub, Florian and Kargl, Frank and Ma, Zhendong and Weber, Michael},
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month = apr,
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year = {2010},
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keywords = {unread},
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pages = {1-6},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/JXGQNUGA/Schaub et al. - 2010 - V-tokens for conditional pseudonymity in VANETs.pdf}
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}
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@article{forsterPUCAPseudonymScheme2016,
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title = {{{PUCA}}: {{A}} Pseudonym Scheme with Strong Privacy Guarantees for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks},
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abstract = {Pseudonym certificates are the state-of-the-art approach for secure and privacy-friendly message authentication in vehicular ad-hoc networks. However, most of the proposed pseudonym schemes focus on privacy among participants. Privacy towards backend providers is usually (if at all) only protected by separation of responsibilities. The protection can be overridden, when the entities collaborate, e.g. when revocation of long-term credentials is required. This approach puts the users' privacy at risk, if the backend systems are not fully trusted.},
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language = {en},
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journal = {Ad Hoc Networks},
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author = {F{\"o}rster, David and Kargl, Frank and L{\"o}hr, Hans},
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year = {2016},
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keywords = {unread},
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pages = {11},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/4RNH9ZR9/Förster et al. - 2016 - PUCA A pseudonym scheme with strong privacy guara.pdf}
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}
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@misc{baldiniAnalysisPrivacyThreat2017,
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type = {Research Article},
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title = {An {{Analysis}} of the {{Privacy Threat}} in {{Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks}} Due to {{Radio Frequency Fingerprinting}}},
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abstract = {In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) used in the road transportation sector, privacy risks may arise because vehicles could be tracked on the basis of the information transmitted by the Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications implemented with the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) standards operating at 5.9 GHz. Various techniques have been proposed in the literature to mitigate these privacy risks including the use of pseudonym schemes, but they are mostly focused on data anonymization at the network and application layer. At the physical layer, the capability to accurately identify and fingerprint wireless devices through their radio frequency (RF) emissions has been demonstrated in the literature. This capability may generate a privacy threat because vehicles can be tracked using the RF emissions of their DSRC devices. This paper investigates the privacy risks related to RF fingerprinting to determine if privacy breaches are feasible in practice. In particular, this paper analyzes the tracking accuracy in challenging RF environments with high attenuation and fading.},
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language = {en},
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howpublished = {https://www.hindawi.com/journals/misy/2017/3041749/},
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journal = {Mobile Information Systems},
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author = {Baldini, Gianmarco and Giuliani, Raimondo and Cano Pons, Eduardo},
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year = {2017},
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keywords = {unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/3JTSBLM8/3041749.html;/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/U5T7NWFF/Baldini et al. - 2017 - An Analysis of the Privacy Threat in Vehicular Ad .pdf},
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doi = {10.1155/2017/3041749}
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}
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@article{quSecurityPrivacyReview2015,
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title = {A {{Security}} and {{Privacy Review}} of {{VANETs}}},
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volume = {16},
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doi = {10.1109/TITS.2015.2439292},
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abstract = {Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have stimulated interest in both academic and industry settings because, once deployed, they would bring a new driving experience to drivers. However, communicating in an open-access environment makes security and privacy issues a real challenge, which may affect the large-scale deployment of VANETs. Researchers have proposed many solutions to these issues. We start this paper by providing background information of VANETs and classifying security threats that challenge VANETs. After clarifying the requirements that the proposed solutions to security and privacy problems in VANETs should meet, on the one hand, we present the general secure process and point out authentication methods involved in these processes. Detailed survey of these authentication algorithms followed by discussions comes afterward. On the other hand, privacy preserving methods are reviewed, and the tradeoff between security and privacy is discussed. Finally, we provide an outlook on how to detect and revoke malicious nodes more efficiently and challenges that have yet been solved.},
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journal = {IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems},
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author = {Qu, Fengzhong and Wu, Zhihui and Wang, Fei-Yue and Cho, Woong},
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month = dec,
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year = {2015},
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keywords = {unread,pseudonyms},
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pages = {2985-2996},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/NSXM95K3/Qu et al. - 2015 - A Security and Privacy Review of VANETs.pdf}
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}
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@article{liuAnonymousGroupMessage,
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title = {Anonymous {{Group Message Authentication Protocol}} for {{LTE}}-Based {{V2X Communications}}},
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doi = {10.1002/itl2.25},
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language = {en},
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author = {Liu, Dongxiao and Ni, Jianbing and Lin, Xiaodong},
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keywords = {unread,pseudonyms},
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pages = {6},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/BSYK88YT/Liu et al. - Anonymous Group Message Authentication Protocol fo.pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{sorensen5GVisionsUser2015,
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title = {{{5G Visions}} of {{User Privacy}}},
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doi = {10.1109/VTCSpring.2015.7145587},
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abstract = {Currently the discussions are going on the elements and definition of 5G networks. One of the elements in this discussion is how to provide for user controlled privacy for securing users' digital interaction. The purpose of this paper is to present elements of user controlled privacy needed for the future 5G networks. The paper concludes that an ecosystem consisting of a Trusted Third Party between the end user and the service providers as a distributed system could be integrated to secure the perspective of user controlled privacy for future services.},
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booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 81st {{Vehicular Technology Conference}} ({{VTC Spring}})},
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author = {Sorensen, L. T. and Khajuria, S. and Skouby, K. E.},
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month = may,
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year = {2015},
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keywords = {5G mobile communication,5G network security,Computer crime,data privacy,digital interaction,ecosystem,Ecosystems,Facebook,Internet,Mobile communication,Privacy,telecommunication security,trusted third party,user privacy},
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pages = {1-4},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/R8XRJEM7/Sorensen et al. - 2015 - 5G Visions of User Privacy.pdf;/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/LGAV8C9C/7145587.html}
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}
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@article{lentzSDDRLightWeightSecure,
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title = {{{SDDR}}: {{Light}}-{{Weight}}, {{Secure Mobile Encounters}}},
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abstract = {Emerging mobile social apps use short-range radios to discover nearby devices and users. The device discovery protocol used by these apps must be highly energy-efficient since it runs frequently in the background. Also, a good protocol must enable secure communication (both during and after a period of device co-location), preserve user privacy (users must not be tracked by unauthorized third parties), while providing selective linkability (users can recognize friends when strangers cannot) and efficient silent revocation (users can permanently or temporarily cloak themselves from certain friends, unilaterally and without re-keying their entire friend set).},
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language = {en},
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author = {Lentz, Matthew and Erdelyi, Viktor and Aditya, Paarijaat and Shi, Elaine and Druschel, Peter and Bhattacharjee, Bobby},
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keywords = {unread},
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pages = {17},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/T6LX2CVF/Lentz et al. - SDDR Light-Weight, Secure Mobile Encounters.pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{nevenPrivacypreservingAttributebasedCredentials2017,
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title = {Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems},
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doi = {10.1109/VNC.2017.8275631},
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abstract = {In Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITSs), vehicles broadcast their location and other information over dedicated short-range radio channels. This communication must be authenticated to protect the information against tampering, but at the same time must be anonymous to protect the location privacy of the driver. The most prominent C-ITS solutions today let vehicles either store large numbers of preloaded pseudonym certificates, or let them regularly fetch new pseudonyms from an online authority. More advanced solutions based on group signatures or anonymous credentials allow vehicles to generate arbitrarily many pseudonyms locally, without requiring further interaction. These solutions, however, are vulnerable to Sybil attacks, as the compromised key material of a single vehicle could be used to impersonate an arbitrary number of vehicles simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new generic approach for C-ITS authentication based on privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credential (ABC) that generates pseudonyms locally on the vehicle, but where only one valid pseudonym can be generated at any given time. The computational performance and signature sizes of current Privacy-ABC schemes makes them more useful for low-frequency warning messages than for high-frequency beaconing. We therefore see our approach rather as a conceptual framework that can direct further research into more efficient dedicated implementations.},
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booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference}} ({{VNC}})},
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author = {Neven, G. and Baldini, G. and Camenisch, J. and Neisse, R.},
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month = nov,
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year = {2017},
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keywords = {data privacy,Privacy,anonymous credentials,Authentication,authorisation,C-ITS authentication,computer network security,Conferences,cooperative communication,Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems,Cryptography,dedicated short-range radio channels,Europe,group signatures,high-frequency beaconing,intelligent transportation systems,location privacy,low-frequency warning messages,mobile computing,online authority,preloaded pseudonym certificates,Privacy-ABC schemes,Privacy-preserving attribute-based credentials,Roads,security,Sybil attacks,transportation,vehicular ad hoc networks,vehicular networks,unread},
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pages = {131-138},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/GJG66F4Y/08275631.pdf;/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/CKPUBPJH/8275631.html}
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}
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@article{boualouacheSurveyPseudonymChanging2018,
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title = {A {{Survey}} on {{Pseudonym Changing Strategies}} for {{Vehicular Ad}}-{{Hoc Networks}}},
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volume = {20},
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abstract = {The initial phase of the deployment of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) has begun and many research challenges still need to be addressed. Location privacy continues to be in the top of these challenges. Indeed, both academia and industry agreed to apply the pseudonym changing approach as a solution to protect the location privacy of VANETs' users. However, due to the pseudonyms linking attack, a simple changing of pseudonym shown to be inefficient to provide the required protection. For this reason, many pseudonym changing strategies have been suggested to provide an effective pseudonym changing. Unfortunately, the development of an effective pseudonym changing strategy for VANETs is still an open issue. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey and classification of pseudonym changing strategies. We then discuss and compare them with respect to some relevant criteria. Finally, we highlight some current researches, and open issues and give some future directions.},
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language = {en},
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number = {1},
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author = {Boualouache, Abdelwahab and Senouci, Sidi-Mohammed and Moussaoui, Samira},
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year = {2018},
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keywords = {unread,pseudonym change strategies,pseudonyms},
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pages = {21},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/VSBWZIA9/Boualouache et al. - 2018 - A Survey on Pseudonym Changing Strategies for Vehi.pdf}
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}
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@article{petitPseudonymSchemesVehicular2015,
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title = {Pseudonym {{Schemes}} in {{Vehicular Networks}}: {{A Survey}}},
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abstract = {Safety-critical applications in cooperative vehicular networks require authentication of nodes and messages. Yet, privacy of individual vehicles and drivers must be maintained. Pseudonymity can satisfy both security and privacy requirements. Thus, a large body of work emerged in recent years, proposing pseudonym solutions tailored to vehicular networks. In this survey, we detail the challenges and requirements for such pseudonym mechanisms, propose an abstract pseudonym lifecycle, and give an extensive overview and categorization of the state of the art in this research area. Specifically, this survey covers pseudonym schemes based on public key and identity-based cryptography, group signatures and symmetric authentication. We compare the different approaches, give an overview of the current state of standardization, and identify open research challenges.},
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language = {en},
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author = {Petit, Jonathan and Schaub, Florian and Feiri, Michael and Kargl, Frank},
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year = {2015},
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keywords = {read,pseudonym change strategies,pseudonyms},
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pages = {33},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/F4BWMU4T/Petit et al. - Pseudonym Schemes in Vehicular Networks A Survey.pdf}
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}
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@misc{Vocabulary3GPPSpecifications,
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title = {Vocabulary for {{3GPP Specifications}}},
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lccn = {3GPP TR 21.905},
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keywords = {unread},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/SLRCYDGA/_.pdf}
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}
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@article{wernkeClassificationLocationPrivacy2014,
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title = {A {{Classification}} of {{Location Privacy Attacks}} and {{Approaches}}},
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volume = {18},
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issn = {1617-4909},
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doi = {10.1007/s00779-012-0633-z},
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number = {1},
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journal = {Personal Ubiquitous Comput.},
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author = {Wernke, Marius and Skvortsov, Pavel and D{\"u}rr, Frank and Rothermel, Kurt},
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month = jan,
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year = {2014},
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keywords = {Adversary,Approaches,Attacks,Classification,Location privacy,Location-based services,Principles,Protection goals,unread},
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pages = {163--175},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/EQ8UD3AY/Wernke et al. - 2014 - A Classification of Location Privacy Attacks and A.pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{zengPseudonymousPKIUbiquitous2006,
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title = {Pseudonymous {{PKI}} for {{Ubiquitous Computing}}},
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doi = {10.1007/11774716_17},
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abstract = {Conventional PKI is the most effective and efficient solution to non-repudiation. But, it also puts user privacy in danger because the user's activities could be tracked via the unique public-key and...},
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language = {en},
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booktitle = {Public {{Key Infrastructure}}},
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publisher = {{Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg}},
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author = {Zeng, Ke},
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month = jun,
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year = {2006},
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keywords = {unread},
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pages = {207-222},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/SKS9QWXC/Zeng - 2006 - Pseudonymous PKI for Ubiquitous Computing.pdf;/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/I7SGM3RR/login.html}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITR1032018,
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title = {{{ETSI TR}} 103 415 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Pre}}-Standardization Study on Pseudonym Change Management},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = apr,
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year = {2018},
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keywords = {read,pseudonym change strategies,pseudonyms},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/7P3MSQYG/tr_103415v010101p.pdf}
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}
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@article{hamidaSecurityCooperativeIntelligent2015,
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title = {Security of {{Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems}}: {{Standards}}, {{Threats Analysis}} and {{Cryptographic Countermeasures}}},
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volume = {4},
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issn = {2079-9292},
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shorttitle = {Security of {{Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems}}},
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doi = {10.3390/electronics4030380},
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abstract = {Due to the growing number of vehicles on the roads worldwide, road traffic accidents are currently recognized as a major public safety problem. In this context, connected vehicles are considered as the key enabling technology to improve road safety and to foster the emergence of next generation cooperative intelligent transport systems (ITS). Through the use of wireless communication technologies, the deployment of ITS will enable vehicles to autonomously communicate with other nearby vehicles and roadside infrastructures and will open the door for a wide range of novel road safety and driver assistive applications. However, connecting wireless-enabled vehicles to external entities can make ITS applications vulnerable to various security threats, thus impacting the safety of drivers. This article reviews the current research challenges and opportunities related to the development of secure and safe ITS applications. It first explores the architecture and main characteristics of ITS systems and surveys the key enabling standards and projects. Then, various ITS security threats are analyzed and classified, along with their corresponding cryptographic countermeasures. Finally, a detailed ITS safety application case study is analyzed and evaluated in light of the European ETSI TC ITS standard. An experimental test-bed is presented, and several elliptic curve digital signature algorithms (ECDSA) are benchmarked for signing and verifying ITS safety messages. To conclude, lessons learned, open research challenges and opportunities are discussed.},
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language = {en},
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number = {3},
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journal = {Electronics},
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author = {Hamida, Elyes and Noura, Hassan and Znaidi, Wassim},
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month = jul,
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year = {2015},
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keywords = {unread},
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pages = {380-423},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/5YHZM7DJ/Hamida et al. - 2015 - Security of Cooperative Intelligent Transport Syst.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010,
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title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 731 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Security Services}} and {{Architecture}}},
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lccn = {ETSI TS 102 731},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = sep,
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year = {2010},
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keywords = {read},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/F3NNPMJC/ts_102731v010101p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012a,
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title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 940 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{ITS}} Communications Security Architecture and Security Management},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = jun,
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year = {2012},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/6D2DLDGB/ts_102940v010101p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014,
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title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-6-1 {{V1}}.2.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 6: {{Internet Integration}}; {{Sub}}-Part 1: {{Transmission}} of {{IPv6 Packets}} over {{GeoNetworking Protocols}}},
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lccn = {ETSI EN 302 636-6-1},
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author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
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month = may,
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year = {2014},
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keywords = {GeoNetworking,pseudonyms,IPv6},
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file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/TRJW42GU/en_3026360601v010201p.pdf}
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}
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@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-4-1 {{V1}}.3.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 4: {{Geographical}} Addressing and Forwarding for Point-to-Point and Point-to-Multipoint Communications; {{Sub}}-Part 1: {{Media}}-{{Independent Functionality}}},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI EN 302 636-4-1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = aug,
|
||
year = {2017},
|
||
keywords = {GeoNetworking},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/H43WFVVS/en_3026360401v010301p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636512017,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-5-1 {{V2}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 5: {{Transport Protocols}}; {{Sub}}-Part 1: {{Basic Transport Protocol}}},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 636-5-1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = aug,
|
||
year = {2017},
|
||
keywords = {GeoNetworking,BTP},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/PSKDF7X4/en_3026360501v020101p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI30263632014,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-3 {{V1}}.2.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 3: {{Network}} Architecture},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 636-3},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = dec,
|
||
year = {2014},
|
||
keywords = {GeoNetworking},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/VIZQJ69B/en_30263603v010201p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{sandonisVehicleInternetCommunications2016,
|
||
title = {Vehicle to {{Internet}} Communications Using the {{ETSI ITS GeoNetworking}} Protocol: {{V}}. {{Sandonis}} et Al.},
|
||
volume = {27},
|
||
issn = {21613915},
|
||
shorttitle = {Vehicle to {{Internet}} Communications Using the {{ETSI ITS GeoNetworking}} Protocol},
|
||
doi = {10.1002/ett.2895},
|
||
abstract = {Vehicular ad hoc networks allow the exchange of information between vehicles to improve road safety. In addition, vehicles can be connected to the Internet through gateways placed alongside the roads, which allow drivers to use common Internet services and new applications specifically oriented to them. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute Technical Committee Intelligent Transport System has standardised the architecture and the communication protocols for an Intelligent Transport System, considering both safety applications and communications with the Internet. The GeoNetworking (GN) protocol has been designed to forward packets inside the vehicular ad hoc network taking safety requirements as the main concern. This paper analyses the GN protocol focusing on the provision of Internet connectivity to vehicles. The main contributions of this work are the identification of sources of performance losses when using the GN protocol in communications with the Internet and the proposal of different mechanisms to improve its performance in this type of communications. The evaluation of the GN protocol and the proposed improvements is conducted by means of extensive simulations. Copyright \textcopyright{} 2014 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
number = {3},
|
||
journal = {Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies},
|
||
author = {Sandonis, Victor and Soto, Ignacio and Calderon, Maria and Urue{\~n}a, Manuel},
|
||
month = mar,
|
||
year = {2016},
|
||
keywords = {GeoNetworking},
|
||
pages = {373-391},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/DE8US3BX/Sandonis et al. - 2016 - Vehicle to Internet communications using the ETSI .pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI30263622013,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-2 {{V1}}.2.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 2: {{Scenarios}}},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 636-2 V1.1.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = nov,
|
||
year = {2013},
|
||
keywords = {unread,GeoNetworking},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/53W38GKN/en_30263602v010201p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI30263612014,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI EN}} 302 636-1 {{V1}}.2.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Vehicular Communications}}; {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Part}} 1: {{Requirements}}},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 636-1 V1.1.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = apr,
|
||
year = {2014},
|
||
keywords = {unread,GeoNetworking},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/5D63HWLL/en_30263601v010201p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012b,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 942 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Access Control}}},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 942 V1.1.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = jun,
|
||
year = {2012},
|
||
keywords = {standards,unread},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/JRVFZCDN/ts_102942v010101p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012c,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 943 {{V1}}.1.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Confidentiality}} Services},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 943 V1.1.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = jun,
|
||
year = {2012},
|
||
keywords = {standards,unread},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/C5Y2VWD2/ts_102943v010101p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032017,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI TS}} 103 097 {{V1}}.3.1; {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Security}}; {{Security}} Header and Certificate Formats},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 103 097 V1.3.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = oct,
|
||
year = {2017},
|
||
keywords = {standards,unread},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/9LFPJKCL/ts_103097v010301p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{polalemanypratsPerformanceStudyIEEE2017,
|
||
title = {Performance Study of the {{IEEE}} 802.11p and {{ETSI GeoNetworking}} Protocols},
|
||
author = {{Pol Alemany Prats}},
|
||
month = may,
|
||
year = {2017},
|
||
keywords = {GeoNetworking},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/Z4UTYR9K/Performance study of the IEEE 802.11p and ETSI GeoNetworking protocols(3).pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{eucomissionc-itsplatformSecurityPolicyGovernance,
|
||
title = {Security {{Policy}} \& {{Governance Framework}} for {{Deployment}} and {{Operation}} of {{European Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{C}}-{{ITS}})},
|
||
author = {{EU Comission C-ITS Platform}},
|
||
keywords = {pseudonym change strategies},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/6KJFFAMX/c-its_security_policy_release_1.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{TN_libero_mab2,
|
||
title = {{{ISO}} 29281-1},
|
||
abstract = {Bibliographische Datenbank (monatlich aktualisiert, 3sprachig) mit ca. 1.100.000 Daten von Normen aus 23 L{\"a}ndern, (z.B. ANSI, DIN, ISO), technischen Regeln sowie von deutschen Rechtsvorschriften mit technischen Bezug und geltenden EU-Richtlinien incl. VDI-Richtlinien. Der Volltextzugriff auf Normen ist nur bei entsprechender Lizenz verf{\"u}gbar!},
|
||
author = {intelligents de transport {ISO/TC 204 Systeme f{\"u}r Verkehrsbeeinflussung und -information , ISO/TC 204 Intelligent transport systems}, ISO/TC 204 Syst{\`e}mes},
|
||
year = {2013},
|
||
keywords = {DIN-Norm,Internationale Norm,Norm,Regeln der Technik,Verzeichnis},
|
||
publisher = {{ISO Internationale Organisation f{\"u}r Normung, ISO International Organization for Standardization, ISO Organisation Internationale de Normalisation}}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@techreport{RFC8200,
|
||
type = {{{STD}}},
|
||
title = {Internet {{Protocol}}, {{Version}} 6 ({{IPv6}}) {{Specification}}},
|
||
number = {86},
|
||
institution = {{RFC Editor}},
|
||
author = {Deering, S. and Hinden, R.},
|
||
month = jul,
|
||
year = {2017},
|
||
issn = {2070-1721},
|
||
howpublished = {Internet Requests for Comments}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@techreport{RFC4291,
|
||
type = {{{RFC}}},
|
||
title = {{{IP Version}} 6 {{Addressing Architecture}}},
|
||
number = {4291},
|
||
institution = {{RFC Editor}},
|
||
author = {Hinden, R. and Deering, S.},
|
||
month = feb,
|
||
year = {2006},
|
||
issn = {2070-1721},
|
||
howpublished = {Internet Requests for Comments},
|
||
note = {http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4291.txt}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{baeckerRFCE014IPv6,
|
||
title = {{RFCE014: IPv6}},
|
||
copyright = {Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License},
|
||
language = {German},
|
||
number = {14},
|
||
author = {Baecker, Anna-Lena and Schrimpe, Clemens}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@techreport{RFC4861,
|
||
type = {{{RFC}}},
|
||
title = {Neighbor {{Discovery}} for {{IP}} Version 6 ({{IPv6}})},
|
||
number = {4861},
|
||
institution = {{RFC Editor}},
|
||
author = {Narten, T. and Nordmark, E. and Simpson, W. and Soliman, H.},
|
||
month = sep,
|
||
year = {2007},
|
||
issn = {2070-1721},
|
||
howpublished = {Internet Requests for Comments},
|
||
note = {http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4861.txt}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032016,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI TS}} 103 248 {{V1}}.1.1 {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ( {{ITS}} ); {{GeoNetworking}}; {{Port Numbers}} for the {{Basic Transport Protocol}} ({{BTP}})},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 103 248 V1.1.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = nov,
|
||
year = {2016},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/U3RMDZ2I/ts_103248v010101p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@techreport{RFC6437,
|
||
type = {{{RFC}}},
|
||
title = {{{IPv6 Flow Label Specification}}},
|
||
number = {6437},
|
||
institution = {{RFC Editor}},
|
||
author = {Amante, S. and Carpenter, B. and Jiang, S. and Rajahalme, J.},
|
||
month = nov,
|
||
year = {2011},
|
||
issn = {2070-1721},
|
||
howpublished = {Internet Requests for Comments}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@techreport{RFC3963,
|
||
type = {{{RFC}}},
|
||
title = {Network {{Mobility}} ({{NEMO}}) {{Basic Support Protocol}}},
|
||
number = {3963},
|
||
institution = {{RFC Editor}},
|
||
author = {Devarapalli, V. and Wakikawa, R. and Petrescu, A. and Thubert, P.},
|
||
month = jan,
|
||
year = {2005},
|
||
issn = {2070-1721},
|
||
howpublished = {Internet Requests for Comments}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{armknechtCrosslayerPrivacyEnhancement2007,
|
||
title = {Cross-Layer {{Privacy Enhancement}} and {{Non}}-Repudiation in {{Vehicular Communication}}},
|
||
abstract = {We propose a security architecture that provides two funda- mental security services for VANETS: i) non-repudiation and ii) privacy enhancement. Due to a new PKI concept, referred to as PKI+, users are autonomous in deriving public keys, certificates and pseudonyms which minimizes the communication to the certificate authority. Security tech- niques are supported on all layers of the protocol stack. In particular we show how to link the PKI+ concepts to solutions for routing in vehicle- to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication.},
|
||
author = {Armknecht, Frederik and Festag, Andreas and Westho, Dirk and Zeng, Ke},
|
||
month = jan,
|
||
year = {2007},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/PEH6YJAF/Armknecht et al. - 2007 - Cross-layer Privacy Enhancement and Non-repudiatio.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@inproceedings{calandrielloEfficientRobustPseudonymous2007,
|
||
address = {New York, NY, USA},
|
||
series = {VANET '07},
|
||
title = {Efficient and {{Robust Pseudonymous Authentication}} in {{VANET}}},
|
||
isbn = {978-1-59593-739-1},
|
||
doi = {10.1145/1287748.1287752},
|
||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{Fourth ACM International Workshop}} on {{Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks}}},
|
||
publisher = {{ACM}},
|
||
author = {Calandriello, Giorgio and Papadimitratos, Panos and Hubaux, Jean-Pierre and Lioy, Antonio},
|
||
year = {2007},
|
||
keywords = {security,vehicular networks,performance,reliability},
|
||
pages = {19--28}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication,
|
||
title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}${_\ast}$},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn},
|
||
pages = {12},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/HJETVNIF/Perrig et al. - The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol∗.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@book{CommunicationTechnologiesVehicles2016,
|
||
address = {New York, NY},
|
||
title = {Communication Technologies for Vehicles},
|
||
isbn = {978-3-319-38920-2},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
publisher = {{Springer Berlin Heidelberg}},
|
||
year = {2016},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/PPCVTWVT/2016 - Communication technologies for vehicles.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{verheulIssueFirstActivate,
|
||
title = {Issue {{First Activate Later Certificates}} for {{V2X}}},
|
||
abstract = {We specify Issue First Activate Later (IFAL). This is an ETSI [11] type of V2X Public Key Infrastructure based on short-lived pseudonymous certificates without Certificate Revocation Lists. IFAL certificates are valid in the future but can only be used together with periodically provided activation codes. IFAL supports controlled de-pseudonymization enabling provisioning to stop for misbehaving vehicles. IFAL allows for flexible policies, trade-offs between three essential V2X properties: trust, privacy and usability. IFAL activation codes are small and can be sent in an SMS, through roadside equipment or even broadcasted. Like the Butterfly scheme [32], IFAL uses key derivation with one base private/public key pair. However in IFAL the security module can be simple as it can be kept oblivious of key derivation.},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
author = {Verheul, Eric R},
|
||
keywords = {pseudonyms},
|
||
pages = {28},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/7BUPIGNJ/Verheul - Issue First Activate Later Certificates for V2X.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@article{dolevSecurityPublicKey1983a,
|
||
title = {On the Security of Public Key Protocols},
|
||
volume = {29},
|
||
issn = {0018-9448},
|
||
doi = {10.1109/TIT.1983.1056650},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
number = {2},
|
||
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},
|
||
author = {Dolev, D. and Yao, A.},
|
||
month = mar,
|
||
year = {1983},
|
||
pages = {198-208}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022014a,
|
||
title = {{{ETSI TS}} 102 894-2 {{V1}}.2.1 {{Intelligent Transport Systems}} ({{ITS}}); {{Users}} and Applications Requirements; {{Part}} 2: {{Applications}} and Facilities Layer Common Data Dictionary},
|
||
lccn = {ETSI TS 102 894-2 V1.2.1},
|
||
author = {{European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)}},
|
||
month = sep,
|
||
year = {2014},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/7K3VSIEV/ts_10289402v010201p.pdf}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@misc{europeancommission-directorategeneralformobilityandtransportEvolutionEURoad2018,
|
||
type = {Statistics},
|
||
title = {Evolution of {{EU}} Road Fatalities over Time},
|
||
howpublished = {https://ec.europa.eu/transport/road\_safety/sites/roadsafety/files/pdf/statistics/trends\_figures.pdf},
|
||
author = {{European Commission - Directorate General for Mobility and Transport}},
|
||
month = apr,
|
||
year = {2018}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@inproceedings{claestingvallVisionZeroEthical1999,
|
||
address = {Melbourne},
|
||
title = {Vision {{Zero}} - {{An}} Ethical Approach to Safety and Mobility},
|
||
abstract = {Vision Zero is a philosophy of road safety that eventually no one will be killed or seriously injured within the road transport system. This paper describes Vision Zero and its view that safety cannot be traded for mobility. The applicability of Vision Zero to Victoria in the short- and long-term is discussed.},
|
||
language = {en},
|
||
author = {{Claes Tingvall} and {Narelle Haworth}},
|
||
month = sep,
|
||
year = {1999},
|
||
file = {/home/spiollinux/Zotero/storage/J9PVY5ED/visionzero.html}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|