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\documentclass[10pt,conference,twocolumn,final,a4paper]{IEEEtran}
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\newcommand{\documenttitle}{An ETSI look at the State of the Art of pseudonym scheme in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication}
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1) Problem statement: The Problem (one is more than sufficient for each paper!)\\
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Networks, Intelligent transportation systems, Security, Mesh networks, Privacy
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- I look only at middle layers \\
- look at ETSI ITS
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% Literature Survey and Background
\section{Background}
\label{sec:background}
\subsection{ITS Architecture}
This section gives a brief overview of the \ac{ETSI} architecture for Intelligent Transport Systems. It isn't meant to be elaborate but has a focus on identifiers and other message contents allowing linkability of messages.
\acp{VANET} have some special requirements: Due to many nodes being constantly on the move at higher speeds, tolerance for quickly changing topologies and low-latency communication are important points. Multi-hop mesh-networking is an important ability to keep the network functional in areas without designated infrastructure.
A \ac{VANET} consists of different kinds of ITS stations: \\
\acfp{OBU} residing inside vehicles can be divided into the communication and \acl{CCU}, managing the \ac{ITS} specific network communication over the car's wireless interfaces, and \acfp{AU} utilising the network services provided by the \ac{CCU} to communicate transparently over a standard \acs{IPv6} stack. \\
On the stationary infrastructure side, \acfp{RSU} can either just provide some special local services or even be connected to a network operator's infrastructure and thus provide an uplink to the Internet.
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.49\textwidth]{figures/schema_internet_communication.png}
\caption{Components of an ITS network, communicating with the internet; source: \cite{sandonisVehicleInternetCommunications2016}}
\label{schema_internet_components}
\end{figure}
The protocol architecture of \ac{ITS} stations according to the \ac{ETSI} reference architecture \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI3026652010} is mostly based on the well-known \ac{OSI} layer model.
\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=0.51\textwidth]{figures/etsi-its-architecture.png}
\caption{The ETSI ITS-station reference architecture, based on \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI3026652010}}
\label{fig:etsi-its-arch}
\end{figure}
\ac{OSI} layers 1 and 2 are combined into the \textit{Access} layer, \ac{OSI} layers 3 and 4 into the \textit{Networking \& Transport} layer and \ac{OSI} layers 5, 6 and 7 are put into the \textit{Facilities} layer (see Fig. \ref{fig:etsi-its-arch} ). \\
The two vertical \textit{Management} and \textit{Security} layers provide supporting functionality throughout the whole stack. \textit{Applications} make use of the \ac{ITS}-station services and thus sit on top of it all.
\todo{participants, structure, special requirements: changing topology, speed, realtime}
Designed for modularity, the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} architecture allows for a big number of access protocols. Similarly, a great variety of applications can run on top of the stack. Because of that variety, access and application layer are considered out-of-scope of this survey.
The \textbf{Networking \& Transport} layer takes care of addressing and routing of messages within the ITS network and multiplexing them to higher-level services. Similarly to the \ac{OSI} model, the groundwork of this functionality is provided by various networking protocols: \\
\ac{ETSI} explicitly mentions the usage of \ac{IPv6} (possibly equipped with mobility support), the CALM FAST protocol \cite{TN_libero_mab2} and the \acf{GN} protocol, which can also be used to encapsulate \ac{IPv6} packets.
CALM FAST \cite{TN_libero_mab2} is a non-IP port-mapper protocol designed for single-hop communication between ITS stations and extensible with additional features. Due to a lack of proper access to the standard document, this protocol is considered out-of-scope of this survey.
\subsubsection{GeoNetworking}
\acf{GN} (\cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI30263612014} et seq.) is an \ac{ETSI}-standardized networking protocol for routing and forwarding packets through \acp{VANET} based on geographical information. It sits between the link and network layer and provides its services to other networking and transport protocols. The background section of \cite{sandonisVehicleInternetCommunications2016} gives a good high-level overview of the \ac{GN} networking architecture and the rationale behind it.
Every \ac{GN} node has to know its geographical position, e.g. through \acp{GNSS}, for the routing to work. The services provided by \ac{GN} are:
\begin{itemize}
\item geo-unicast: routing a packet to a single node at a specific location
\item geo-multicast: first routing a packet to a specified destination area, then flooding it to all nodes within that area
\item topology-scoped broadcast: broadcast of packet within a certain numberof neighbour hops
\item single-hop broadcast: sending packets to all neighbouring nodes
\item geo-anycast: routing packet to an arbitrary node within a specified geographical area
\end{itemize}
For this to work, each node maintains a \ac{LT} with the positions of its direct neighbours. This \ac{LT} is populated with information from periodically-sent beaconing messages. These beacons advertise a node's position, \ac{GN} address, its speed, station type and heading (see \ref{GN-identifiers}. This information is also included in all other sent \ac{GN} packets. \ac{LT} entries have a lifetime attached, after which they expire if not refreshed periodically.
For allowing to retrieve the position of non-neighbour nodes, the \ac{LS}, a collaborative functionality of all nodes, forwards request packets, until the node with the destination \ac{GN} address is found and has replied via geo-unicast or a retransmission counter has expired.\todo{influence of frequent pseudonym change}
Security properties of \ac{GN} messages are ensured by signing (authenticity), encrypting (confidentiality) the messages and checking their plausability and consistency. The necessary information for that is given in a security header \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017}.
\subsubsection{IPv6}
\acsu{IPv6} \cite{RFC8200} \nocite{baeckerRFCE014IPv6} specifies the 6th version of the Internet Protocol, the routing protocol used in the networking layer of the Internet. Relevant details for \acp{VANET} are the addressing using 128 bit long IP addresses \cite{RFC4291} with the first up to 64 bits specifiying the network part and the last 64 bits specifying the interface ID (node ID) within that subnetwork. Additionally to the globally unique routable IPv6 address, nodes are also addressable with their link-local address. This special address is only valid in the scope of the same \ac{OSI} layer 2 link and is automatically derived from lower-layer identifiers. Together with the huge number of globally unique \ac{IPv6} addresses, this new property makes it usable for vehicular ad-hoc networks. Another improvement in \ac{IPv6} is \textit{neighbour discovery} \cite{RFC4861} using link-local multicast. One application of that is the \textit{\acf{RA}}, where routers just periodically announce their parameters so clients are able to derive an address themselves without further negotiation.
\subsubsection{IPv6 over GeoNetworking}
Transparently exposing IP networking to higher layers allows re-using existing services based on the classical Internet TCP/IP stack without modification. The \acf{GN6ASL} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014} specifies a mechanism for sending \ac{IPv6} packets over the GN protocol by using it as a sub-IP coupling layer. \ac{GN} takes care of encapsulating and routing the IP packets to its final destination node, so that the whole underlying \ac{VANET} looks like a flat layer 2 network to IP services.
\ac{GN6ASL} specifies how to derive a \ac{GN} address from an \ac{IPv6} address and extends \ac{IPv6} with some \acl{GN} specific extensions like geographic multicast, Geographically
Scoped stateless Address Configuration or (un)reachability detection.
\subsubsection{BTP}
The transport layer protocol above \acl{GN} is the \acf{BTP} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636512017}. It provides a connectionless multiplexing/ demultiplexing of datagrams to the layers above, adding minimal overhead while providing an unreliable packet transport comparable to UDP.
If \ac{IPv6} over \ac{GN} is used at the network layer, transport protocols like TCP and UDP from the standard Internet protocol suite can of course be used, too.
The \textbf{Facilities Layer} unifies the three upper \ac{OSI} layers (application, presentation, session layer) and provides different support tasks to services and applications like time management, position management, database management and session management. It is also responsible to manage service priorities when passing down data to the Network and Transport Layer.
The \textbf{Security Layer} is a vertical layer providing security functionality like identity, key and certificate management to all other layers. It also contains all cryptographic functions like encryption or verification of data.
The \textbf{Management Layer} takes care of software changes like updates and installation of additional components and is considered out-of-scope of this survey.
\subsection{Identifiers}
There are many different addresses, IDs or other identifying information scattered around the network layers. This sections gives a list of relevant identifiers and the information encoded in them. Media-dependent, that means bound to a certain physical or data link layer, additional identifiers are considered out-of-scope.
\subsubsection{GeoNetworking}
\label{GN-identifiers}
Each \ac{GN} node is identified by a 64bit GN\_ADDR address \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017}, containing information about the \ac{ITS} station type (passenger car, cyclist, pedestrian, \ac{RSU}, …) and 48bit derived from the link-layer address. In case of a pseudonym change, only the latter part is supposed to change.
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.47\textwidth]{figures/GeoNetworking_structure.png}
\caption{Structure of an unsecured \ac{GN} packet, source: \cite{hamidaSecurityCooperativeIntelligent2015}}
\label{fig:GNstructure}
\end{figure}
As shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure}, \ac{GN} packets have a basic, a common and an optional extended header. The \textit{basic header} contains information like the packet's maximum lifetime and the remaining hop limit. These information are non-critical for identification. The \textit{common header} also doesn't contain identifying, only the flag indicating a mobile or stationary \ac{ITS} station could slightly reduce the anonymity set. The \textit{extended header} fields depend on the actual \ac{GN} package type and can contain information like the sequence number (initialized with 0) and position vectors.
The \ac{LT} is populated with information from beaconing messages and all other messages received by the \ac{ITS} node. \acl{LT} entries also contain identifying data: Additionally to the GN\_ADDR, station type and link-layer address of the peer node it contains a timestamped geographical position (including accuracy), its current speed and its heading. \todo{update position/ reacquire it when changing pseudonym}
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.49\textwidth]{figures/GeoNetworking_structure_secured.png}
\caption{Structure of a secured \ac{GN} packet, source: \cite{hamidaSecurityCooperativeIntelligent2015}}
\label{fig:GNstructure_secured}
\end{figure}
Parts of \ac{GN} packets can be secured by wrapping them into security headers as defined in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032017} as shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured}. This service is provided by the vertical security layer in the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} architecture and secures all parts shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured} between security header and trailer according to the chosen security profile. The standard defines security profiles for encrypted, signed, externally signed, and signed encrypted messages.
The certificates used contain information about signer subject (name, type, keys), validity restrictions and the actual certificate signature from the \ac{CA}.
The signer information can be given in form of a digest, certificate or certificate chain.
The security trailer contains a signature for verifying authenticity and integrity of the message.
\todo{sequence number initialized with 0}
\todo{packet buffers: LS, forwarding}
\subsubsection{BTP}
The \ac{BTP} header as defined in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636512017} is only 4 bytes long and has a quite simple structure. \\
There are 2 modes of operation for BTP: \textit{interactive packet transport} using the BTP-A header, meant for services requiring replies to their messages, and \textit{non-interactive packet transport} using the BTP-B header.
The BTP-A header consists out of 2 16bit numbers denoting the source and destination ports. The BTP-B header contains the 16bit long destination port and 16bit for optional destination port information (depending on the service).
Some of the facility layer services have well-known ports assigned in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032016}, so the destination port might identify the service used.
\subsubsection{IPv6}
While each IPv6-capable network interface can have multiple addresses, it has at least one link-local address with the interface ID (the lower 64bits) uniquely derived from its data-link layer address. The mapping of IPv6 link-local address and GN\_ADDR is straight-forward, as both addresses are deterministically derived from the same 48bit link layer address. Additionally to the IPv6 address, the IPv6 header can also contain a 20bit \textit{flow label} \cite{RFC6437} which could lead to partial linkability of packets even after an address change: Although a flow shall be identified by the triplet of flow label, source and destination address, an equal flow label could indicate the resumption of a connection even after an address change.
There exists a static mapping between IPv6 multicast groups and geographical areas (relative to the station). That means it is possible to contact IPv6-based services within a node's surrounding. But as this mapping is static and relative, it shouldn't help reidentifying hosts.
\acfp{GVL} are another important concept for understanding the visibility scope of IPv6 packets to other nodes. These virtual links are defined as non-overlapping, restricted geographical areas wherein all IPv6 multicasts within the same subnet are forwarded via \ac{GN} to all nodes of that \ac{GVL}. Usually this is a zone around a specific \ac{RSU} serving as an Internet uplink and thus managing the whole subnet and its addresses. Globally routable IPv6 addresses are usually obtained via the stateless autoconfiguration with the help of \acp{RA}. So changing the \ac{GVL} means getting another IPv6 prefix announced via \ac{RA} and thus implies a change in the node's global IPv6 address.
There are no obvious identifiers specified in the Facilities layer, though some might be introduced in real-world implementations.
\section{Pseudonym Schemes}
As shown in the previous section, \ac{ITS} communication contains many identifiers potentially allowing linking vehicle communication even over longer periods of time and thus track and create movement profiles of vehicles.
This is a clear threat to the vehicle user's privacy, more precisely the \textit{location privacy}. Complete anonymity of all network participants is no viable countermeasure, as security critical systems like these require certain levels of authenticity of data and accountability of the participants. Furthermore, request-response message schemes require at least short-term linkability of messages to establish a mutual session.
A widely chosen approach for restoring user privacy is the usage of temporary pseudonyms for identification in the network. This section will look at the usage and kinds of pseudonym schemes in the ETSI standards, explore other approaches outside of the standardized ETSI world and look at the issue of when to change pseudonyms to minimize long-term linkability of nodes.
\subsection{Pseudonym Schemes for ETSI ITS Systems}
\subsubsection{Pseudonym Management}
\nocite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}The \ac{ETSI} standard on trust and privacy management \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012} mentions the goal of pseudonymity and unlinkability of \ac{ITS} nodes and their messages as the way to achieve ITS privacy. This privacy goal is subdivided into two dimensions:
The \textbf{privacy} of ITS registration and authorisation shall be achieved by limiting the knbowledge of a node's canonical (fixed) identifier to a limited number of authorities. Furthermore, the responsibility for verifying the validity of a canonical identifier is given to an \acf{EA} and split from the authorisation to services by the \acf{AA}. These both authorites need to be operated in different areas of control to achieve a surplus of privacy.\\
During manufacture the following data is to be stored in an ITS node using a physically secure process:
\begin{itemize}
\item a globally unique canonical identifier
\item contact addresses + public keys of an \ac{EA} and\ac{AA},
\item a public key
\item a network address
\item a set of trusted \ac{EA} and \ac{AA} certificates
\end{itemize}
The \ac{EA} has to hold the following information about a node: The permanent canonical identifier, its enrolment credentials, its public key and a link to further profile information.
ITS nodes can now request an enrolment certificate with their enrolment credentials from the EA. The task of the \ac{EA} is to verify that an \ac{ITS} node can be trusted to function correctly as the EA must only know the credentials of certified \ac{ITS} nodes. Credentials of compromised nodes have to be revoked. With the enrolment request being encrypted and signed by the enrolling node and the response being encrypted as well, only the \ac{EA} knows the mapping between the enrolment certificate and the requesting identity. The enrolment certificate contains a pseudonymous identifier being signed with a certificate chain leading back to the originating \ac{EA}.
This enrolment certificate can then be used to get \acfp{AT} from an \ac{AA}. These \acp{AT} too are certificates denoting the permissions a node has. \\
All authority responses are encrypted and signed in a for the node verifiable way. Certificate requests include a start and end time as well as a \textit{challenge} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}, a random string encrypted with the public key of the receiver. These two measures prevent against message replay attacks. Enrolment credentials and \acp{AT} can also be updated if needed over similar mechanisms.
The second dimension of privacy covers the communication between \ac{ITS} stations. The obtained authorization tickets serve as pseudonyms for authenticating and signing messages with other \ac{ITS} services and nodes. ITS stations have to check the validity of the \ac{AT} certificates included in every message and can check the permissions for the message's action (e.g. sending messages to certain broadcast domains) or access to certain services. These pseudonyms are to be regularly changed to preserve the privacy of the node's user by achieving long-term unlinkability of messages by the ITS node. According to \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017} the \ac{AT} may even be used to derive a \ac{GN}\_ADDR from.\\
There are differnt kinds of \acp{AT}: Those used by official role vehicles (e.g. state authorities) and \ac{ITS} infrastructure don't need to preserve the node's privacy and thus can contain a long-lived identifier for the official role they are fulfilling. \acp{AT} of personal user nodes can contain further personal identifying information if required for service usage, but then shall only be sent to already authorized nodes over encrypted channels.\todo{restrict this only to services where this is really necessary} For broadcasting, first contact and all other uses, personal user nodes shall only use minimal pseudonymous \acp{AT} which then can be sent even over non-encrypted channels.
The \ac{ETSI} standard \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010} mentions the retaining of an audit log of incoming messages as the way of holding nodes \textbf{accountable} in case of misbehaviour. This only helps though if the \ac{EA} retains a mapping of enrolment certificate to the canonical identifiers they were given to and the \ac{AA} does the some for \acp{AT} and enrolment certificates. The legal and organisatorial framework for making sure that the information from the \ac{EA} and \ac{AA} are only combined for legitimate cases is crucial for maintaining user privacy, but are left out-of-scope of this survey.
For \textbf{revocation} of node access to the \ac{ITS} network, e.g. in case of misbehaviour, there exist multiple mechanisms: The \ac{EA} can be told to revoke the node's enrolment credentials to prevent it from updating its enrolment certificate and thus acquiring further \acp{AT}. Additionally, the \ac{EA} revokes the validity of the enrolment certificate and the \ac{AA} does the same for the authorization tickets. As ITS nodes are expected to check the validity of certificates using \acfp{CRL} and \acfp{CTL} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITR1032018}, messages of the revoked node are not accepted anymore.
\subsubsection{Pseudonym Change for IPv6 ITS Networking}
Section 11 of the \ac{ETSI} standard on IPv6 usage over \ac{GN} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014} covers the support for pseudonymes and their change of that protocol stack. The binding of a \ac{GVL}'s prefix to a distinct geographical area can be a threat to users' location privacy as a static interface identifier part of the IPv6 address would allow singling out a node over multiple \ac{GVL} networks and track their location by the \ac{GVL} prefix and its associated geographical region. \\
The proposed countermeasure is again the adoption and regular change of pseudonyms. In this case the affected identifier is the interface identifier part of IPv6 address. As this identifier is derived from the link-layer address, this also implies a change of the link-layer identifier address (MAC address). The same is true for the \ac{GN}\_ADDR thus it also changes accordingly with the changed link-layer address. All existing IPv6 addresses have to be terminated as a clear cut between the old and new pseudonym IP address has to be made to prevent correlation of the old and new pseudonym during migration. A possible countermeasure against the interruption is the usage of \textit{Network Mobility support} \cite{RFC3963}. As this mobility support requires a home agent where all traffic flows through, this home agent needs to be trusted as it still has the possibility of loction tracking by \ac{GVL}.
\subsection{Further Pseudonym Techniques}
\subsection{Pseudonym Change Strategies}
\section{Evaluation}
\subsection{Attacker Model}
The trust assumptions of the ETSI ITS security services architecture are layed out in section 6.2.5 of \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}.
\todo{sybil attack}
\section{Summary}
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\section{Glossary}
\nobreak
\begin{acronym}[GN6ASL]
\input{glossary.tex}
\end{acronym}
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\bibliography{mybib}
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