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glossary.tex
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
\acro{GN}{GeoNetworking}
\acro{GNSS}{Global Navigation Satellite System}
\acro{GVL}{Geographical Virtual Link}
\acro{HSM}{Hardware Security Module}: a dedicated piece of hardware providing strictly regulated access to cryptographic operations based on stored data (e.g. keys)
\acro{HSM}{Hardware Security Module}
\acro{IPv6}{Internet Protocol version 6}
\acro{ITS}{Intelligent Transportation System}
\acro{LLC}{Logical Link Control}

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}
%\renewcommand{\Hide}[1]{}
\newcommand{\documenttitle}{An ETSI look at the State of the Art of pseudonym scheme in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication}
\newcommand{\documenttitle}{An ETSI look at the State of the Art of pseudonym schemes in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication}
\begin{document}
@ -102,18 +102,18 @@ Networks, Intelligent transportation systems, Security, Mesh networks, Privacy
\IEEEPARstart{I}{n} recent
years, traffic got safer and safer. Improved safety technologies in our vehicles have contributed a lot to that development. But so far safety assistant systems are mostly working on their own while trying to evaluate the situation around them. \\
\aclp{ITS} aim to create an ecosystem of networked vehicles and their infrastructure, collaborating with other vehicles and road infrastructure to improve safety and additionally providing new services to users. This step will be crucial for achieving the \textit{vision zero} of no death caused by traffic worldwide.
\aclp{ITS} aim to create an ecosystem of networked vehicles and their infrastructure, collaborating with other vehicles and road infrastructure to improve safety and additionally providing new services to users. This step will be crucial for achieving the \textit{vision zero} of no deaths caused by traffic worldwide.
While being an important step for traffic safety, \ac{ITS} can pose a danger for user's privacy as always connected vehicles sending their positional data around in computer networks might allow tracking the users and creating location profiles. \\
Multiple solutions have been proposed so far to tackle this issue, protecting the human right of privacy.
There also already are some surveys giving an overview about the usage of different \textit{pseudonym schemes} for preserving privacy in \acp{ITS}. But ofthen the cutting-edge research is far ahead of standardization attempts, while the latter are deciding how future practical implementations might work while the former can provide valuable inspirations and introduce new technologies to the stack.
There already are some surveys giving an overview about the usage of different \textit{pseudonym schemes} for preserving privacy in \acp{ITS}. But often the cutting-edge research is far ahead of standardization attempts, while the latter are deciding how future practical implementations might work while the former can provide valuable inspirations and introduce new technologies to the stack.
This survey combines the current status of the European standardization efforts for \acp{ITS} by the \ac{ETSI} with state-of-the-art approaches from newer research.
Thereby it takes a look at how the middle layers of the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} standard architecture are affected by the threat against privacy and what can be done about this.
In section \ref{sec:background} I describe the background knowledge needed to judge the functionality of \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} networks by giving an overview of their architecture. Afterwards I describe the protocols involved in the middle layers of the networking stack and single out potential identifiers usable for tracking of users.
In Section \ref{sec:background} I describe the background knowledge needed to judge the functionality of \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} networks by giving an overview of their architecture. Afterwards I describe the protocols involved in the middle layers of the networking stack and single out potential identifiers usable for the tracking of users.
In section \ref{sec:schemes} I describe the pseudonym scheme proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standard, emphasize the importance of pseudonym change strategies and present some further cutting edge pseudonym schemes not covered by standards so far.
In Section \ref{sec:schemes} I describe the pseudonym scheme proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standard, emphasize the importance of pseudonym change strategies and present some further cutting edge pseudonym schemes not covered by standards so far.
Section \ref{sec:evaluation} defines attacker models, uses them to evaluate the privacy gained by the \ac{ETSI} pseudonym scheme and looks at the feasability of that approach from a performance perspective.
@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ This section gives a brief overview of the \ac{ETSI} architecture for Intelligen
\acp{VANET} have some special requirements: Due to many nodes being constantly on the move at higher speeds, tolerance for quickly changing topologies and low-latency communication are important points. Multi-hop mesh-networking is an important ability to keep the network functional in areas without designated infrastructure.
A \ac{VANET} consists of different kinds of ITS stations: \\
\acfp{OBU} residing inside vehicles can be divided into the communication and \acl{CCU}, managing the \ac{ITS} specific network communication over the car's wireless interfaces, and \acfp{AU} utilizing the network services provided by the \ac{CCU} to communicate transparently over a standard \acs{IPv6} stack. \\
On the stationary infrastructure side, \acfp{RSU} can either just provide some special local services or even be connected to a network operator's infrastructure and thus provide an uplink to the Internet.
\acfp{OBU} residing inside vehicles can be divided into the communication and \acf{CCU}, managing the \ac{ITS} specific network communication over the car's wireless interfaces, and \acfp{AU} utilizing the network services provided by the \ac{CCU} to communicate transparently over a standard \acs{IPv6} stack. \\
On the stationary infrastructure side, \acfp{RSU} can either just provide some special local services or even be connected to a network operator's infrastructure and thus provide an uplink to the Internet (see Fig. \ref{fig:schema_internet_components}).
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.48\textwidth]{figures/schema_internet_communication.png}
@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Every \ac{GN} node has to know its geographical position, e.g. through \acp{GNSS
\item geo-anycast: routing packet to an arbitrary node within a specified geographical area
\end{itemize}
For this to work, each node maintains a \ac{LT} with the positions of its direct neighbours. This \ac{LT} is populated with information from periodically-sent beaconing messages. These beacons advertise a node's position, \ac{GN} address, its speed, station type and heading (see \ref{GN-identifiers}. This information is also included in all other sent \ac{GN} packets. \ac{LT} entries have a lifetime attached, after which they expire if not refreshed periodically.
For this to work, each node maintains a \ac{LT} with the positions of its direct neighbours. This \ac{LT} is populated with information from periodically-sent beaconing messages. These beacons advertise a node's position, \ac{GN} address, its speed, station type and heading (see \ref{GN-identifiers}). This information is also included in all other sent \ac{GN} packets. \ac{LT} entries have a lifetime attached, after which they expire if not refreshed periodically.
Security properties of \ac{GN} messages are ensured by signing (authenticity), encrypting (confidentiality) the messages and checking their plausibility and consistency. The necessary information for that is given in a security header \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017}.
@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Security properties of \ac{GN} messages are ensured by signing (authenticity), e
\subsubsection{IPv6 over GeoNetworking}
Transparently exposing IP networking to higher layers allows re-using existing services based on the classical Internet TCP/IP stack without modification. The \acf{GN6ASL} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014} specifies a mechanism for sending \ac{IPv6} packets over the GN protocol by using it as a sub-IP coupling layer. \ac{GN} takes care of encapsulating and routing the IP packets to its final destination node, so that the whole underlying \ac{VANET} looks like a flat layer 2 network to IP services.
Transparently exposing IP networking to higher layers allows re-using existing services based on the classical Internet TCP/IP stack without modification. The \acf{GN6ASL} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014} specifies a mechanism for sending \ac{IPv6} packets over the GN protocol by using it as a sub-IP coupling layer. \ac{GN} takes care of encapsulating and routing the IP packets to their final destination node, so that the whole underlying \ac{VANET} looks like a flat layer 2 network to IP services.
\ac{GN6ASL} specifies how to derive a \ac{GN} address from an \ac{IPv6} address and extends \ac{IPv6} with some \acl{GN} specific extensions like geographic multicast, Geographically
Scoped stateless Address Configuration or (un)reachability detection.
@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ The \textbf{Management Layer} takes care of software changes like updates and in
\subsection{Identifiers}
There are many different addresses, IDs or other identifying information scattered around the network layers. This sections gives a list of relevant identifiers and the information encoded in them. Media-dependent, that means bound to a certain physical or data link layer, additional identifiers are considered out-of-scope.
There are many different addresses, IDs or other identifying information scattered around the network layers. This sections gives a list of relevant identifiers and the information encoded in them. Media-dependent, that means bound to a certain physical or data link layer technology, additional identifiers are considered out-of-scope.
\subsubsection{GeoNetworking}
\label{GN-identifiers}
@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ Each \ac{GN} node is identified by a 64bit GN\_ADDR address \cite{europeanteleco
\label{fig:GNstructure}
\end{figure}
As shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure}, \ac{GN} packets have a basic, a common and an optional extended header. The \textit{basic header} contains information like the packet's maximum lifetime and the remaining hop limit. These information are non-critical for identification. The \textit{common header} also doesn't contain identifying, only the flag indicating a mobile or stationary \ac{ITS} station could slightly reduce the anonymity set. The \textit{extended header} fields depend on the actual \ac{GN} package type and can contain information like the sequence number (initialized with 0) and position vectors.
As shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure}, \ac{GN} packets have a basic, a common and an optional extended header. The \textit{basic header} contains information like the packet's maximum lifetime and the remaining hop limit. These information are non-critical for identification. The \textit{common header} also doesn't contain identifying information, only the flag indicating a mobile or stationary \ac{ITS} station could slightly reduce the anonymity set. The \textit{extended header} fields depend on the actual \ac{GN} package type and can contain information like the sequence number (initialized with 0) and position vectors.
The \ac{LT} is populated with information from beaconing messages and all other messages received by the \ac{ITS} node. \acl{LT} entries also contain identifying data: Additionally to the GN\_ADDR, station type and link-layer address of the peer node it contains a timestamped geographical position (including accuracy), its current speed and its heading.
@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ The \ac{LT} is populated with information from beaconing messages and all other
\label{fig:GNstructure_secured}
\end{figure}
Parts of \ac{GN} packets can be secured by wrapping them into security headers as defined in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032017} as shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured}. This service is provided by the vertical security layer in the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} architecture and secures all parts shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured} between security header and trailer according to the chosen security profile. The standard defines security profiles for encrypted, signed, externally signed, and signed encrypted messages.
Parts of \ac{GN} packets can be secured by wrapping them into security headers as defined in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1032017} and shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured}. This service is provided by the vertical security layer in the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} architecture and secures all parts shown in Fig. \ref{fig:GNstructure_secured} between security header and trailer according to the chosen security profile. The standard defines security profiles for encrypted, signed, externally signed, and signed encrypted messages.
The certificates used contain information about signer subject (name, type, keys), validity restrictions and the actual certificate signature from the \ac{CA}.
The signer information can be given in form of a digest, certificate or certificate chain.
@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Some further identifiers might be introduced in real-world implementations, e.g.
\section{Pseudonym Schemes}
\label{sec:schemes}
As shown in the previous section, \ac{ITS} communication contains many identifiers potentially allowing linking vehicle communication even over longer periods of time and thus track and create movement profiles of vehicles.
As shown in the previous section, \ac{ITS} communication contains many identifiers potentially allowing linking vehicle communication even over longer periods of time and thus tracking and creating movement profiles of vehicles.
This is a clear threat to the vehicle user's privacy, more precisely the \textit{location privacy}. Complete anonymity of all network participants is no viable countermeasure, as security critical systems like these require certain levels of authenticity of data and accountability of the participants. Furthermore, request-response message schemes require at least short-term linkability of messages to establish a mutual session. This is needed e.g. for requesting data from infrastructure or managing automatical payment at car chargers.
@ -267,8 +267,8 @@ A widely chosen approach for restoring user privacy is the usage of temporary ps
\nocite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}The \ac{ETSI} standard on trust and privacy management \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022012} mentions the goal of pseudonymity and unlinkability of \ac{ITS} nodes and their messages as the way to achieve ITS privacy. This privacy goal is subdivided into two dimensions:
The \textbf{privacy} of ITS registration and authorization shall be achieved by limiting the knowledge of a node's canonical (fixed) identifier to a limited number of authorities. Furthermore, the responsibility for verifying the validity of a canonical identifier is given to an \acf{EA} and split from the authorization to services by the \acf{AA}. These both authorities are parts of the needed \ac{PKI} and need to be operated in different areas of control to achieve a surplus of privacy.\\
During manufacture the following data is to be stored in an ITS node using a physically secure process:
The \textbf{privacy} of ITS registration and authorization shall be achieved by limiting the knowledge of a node's canonical (fixed) identifier to a limited number of authorities. Furthermore, the responsibility for verifying the validity of a canonical identifier is given to an \acf{EA} and split from the authorization to services by the \acf{AA}. Both these authorities are parts of the needed \ac{PKI} and need to be operated in different areas of control to achieve a surplus of privacy.\\
During manufacture, the following data is to be stored in an ITS node using a physically secure process:
\begin{itemize}
\item a globally unique canonical identifier
\item contact addresses + public keys of an \ac{EA} and\ac{AA},
@ -276,8 +276,9 @@ During manufacture the following data is to be stored in an ITS node using a phy
\end{itemize}
The \ac{EA} has to hold the following information about a node: The permanent canonical identifier, its enrollment credentials, its public key and a link to further profile information.
ITS nodes can now request an enrolment certificate with their enrolment credentials from the EA. The task of the \ac{EA} is to verify that an \ac{ITS} node can be trusted to function correctly as the EA must only know the credentials of certified \ac{ITS} nodes. Credentials of compromised nodes have to be revoked. With the enrollment request being encrypted and signed by the enrolling node and the response being encrypted as well, only the \ac{EA} knows the mapping between the enrollment certificate and the requesting identity. The enrollment certificate contains a pseudonymous identifier being signed with a certificate chain leading back to the originating \ac{EA}.
This enrollment certificate can then be used to get \acfp{AT} from an \ac{AA}. These \acp{AT} too are certificates denoting the permissions a node has. Authorization ticket certificates may be stored in a \ac{HSM}, at least the security service Specification \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010} offers such an option. \\
All authority responses are encrypted and signed in a for the node verifiable way. Certificate requests include a start and end time as well as a \textit{challenge} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}, a random string encrypted with the public key of the receiver. These two measures prevent against message replay attacks. Enrolment credentials and \acp{AT} can also be updated if needed over similar mechanisms.
This enrollment certificate can then be used to get \acfp{AT} from an \ac{AA}. These \acp{AT} too are certificates denoting the permissions a node has. Authorization ticket certificates may be stored in a \ac{HSM} to prevent direct unregulated access to the cryptographic keys, at least the security service Specification \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010} offers such an option. \\
All authority responses are encrypted and signed in a way verifiable for the node. Certificate requests include a start and end time as well as a \textit{challenge} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}, a random string encrypted with the public key of the receiver. These two measures prevent against message replay attacks. Enrolment credentials and \acp{AT} can also be updated if needed over similar mechanisms. \\
The overall trust model is sketched in Figure \ref{fig:pki}.
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.48\textwidth]{figures/etsi-pki.png}
@ -289,24 +290,24 @@ All authority responses are encrypted and signed in a for the node verifiable wa
The second dimension of privacy covers the communication between \ac{ITS} stations. The obtained authorization tickets serve as pseudonyms for authenticating and signing messages with other \ac{ITS} services and nodes. ITS stations have to check the validity of the \ac{AT} certificates included in every message and can check the permissions for the message's action (e.g. sending messages to certain broadcast domains) or access to certain services. These pseudonyms are to be regularly changed to preserve the privacy of the node's user by achieving long-term unlinkability of messages by the ITS node. According to \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636412017} the \ac{AT} may even be used to derive a \ac{GN}\_ADDR from.\\
There are different kinds of \acp{AT}: Those used by official role vehicles (e.g. state authorities) and \ac{ITS} infrastructure don't always need to preserve the node's privacy and thus can contain a long-lived identifier for the official role they are fulfilling. \acp{AT} of personal user nodes can contain further personal identifying information if required for service usage, but then shall only be sent to already authorized nodes over encrypted channels. For broadcasting, first contact and all other uses, personal user nodes shall only use minimal pseudonymous \acp{AT} which then can be sent even over non-encrypted channels.
The \ac{ETSI} standard \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010} mentions the retaining of an audit log of incoming messages as the way of holding nodes \textbf{accountable} in case of misbehaviour. This only helps though if the \ac{EA} retains a mapping of enrollment certificate to the canonical identifiers they were given to and the \ac{AA} does the some for \acp{AT} and enrolment certificates. The legal and organisational framework for making sure that the information from the \ac{EA} and \ac{AA} are only combined for legitimate cases is crucial for maintaining user privacy, but are left out-of-scope of this survey.
The \ac{ETSI} standard \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010} mentions the retaining of an audit log of incoming messages as the way of holding nodes \textbf{accountable} in case of misbehaviour. This only helps though if the \ac{EA} retains a mapping of enrollment certificates to the canonical identifiers they were given to and the \ac{AA} does the some for \acp{AT} and enrolment certificates. The legal and organisational framework for making sure that the information from the \ac{EA} and \ac{AA} are only combined for legitimate cases is crucial for maintaining user privacy, but is left out-of-scope of this survey.
For \textbf{revocation} of node access to the \ac{ITS} network, e.g. in case of misbehaviour, there exist multiple mechanisms: The \ac{EA} can be told to revoke the node's enrollment credentials to prevent it from updating its enrollment certificate and thus acquiring further \acp{AT}. Additionally, the \ac{EA} revokes the validity of the enrollment certificate and the \ac{AA} does the same for the authorization tickets. As ITS nodes are expected to check the validity of certificates using \acfp{CRL} and \acfp{CTL} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITR1032018}, messages of the revoked node are not accepted anymore.
\subsubsection{Pseudonym Change for IPv6 ITS Networking}
Section 11 of the \ac{ETSI} standard on IPv6 usage over \ac{GN} \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSI302636612014} covers the support for pseudonyms and their change of that protocol stack. The binding of a \ac{GVL}'s prefix to a distinct geographical area can be a threat to users' location privacy as a static interface identifier part of the IPv6 address would allow singling out a node over multiple \ac{GVL} networks and track their location by the \ac{GVL} prefix and its associated geographical region. \\
The proposed countermeasure is again the adoption and regular change of pseudonyms. In this case the affected identifier is the interface identifier part of IPv6 address. As this identifier is derived from the link-layer address, this also implies a change of the link-layer identifier address (MAC address). The same is true for the \ac{GN}\_ADDR thus it also changes accordingly with the changed link-layer address. All existing IPv6 addresses have to be terminated as a clear cut between the old and new pseudonym IP address has to be made to prevent correlation of the old and new pseudonym during migration. A possible countermeasure against the interruption is the usage of \textit{Network Mobility support} \cite{RFC3963}. As this mobility support requires a home agent where all traffic flows through, this home agent needs to be trusted as it still has the possibility of location tracking by \ac{GVL}.
The proposed countermeasure is again the adoption and regular change of pseudonyms. In this case the affected identifier is the interface identifier part of IPv6 address. As this identifier is derived from the link-layer address, this also implies a change of the link-layer identifier address (MAC address). The same is true for the \ac{GN}\_ADDR thus it also changes accordingly with the changed link-layer address. All existing IPv6 connections have to be terminated as a clear cut between the old and new pseudonym IP address has to be made to prevent correlation of the old and new pseudonym during migration. A possible countermeasure against the interruption is the usage of \textit{Network Mobility support} \cite{RFC3963}. As this mobility support requires a home agent where all traffic flows through, this home agent needs to be trusted as it still has the possibility of location tracking by \ac{GVL}.
\subsection{Pseudonym Change Strategies}\label{sec:change-strategies}
A crucial parameter of pseudonym schemes has been left out so far: How and when pseudonyms are actually changed. To show why that is so important, let us imagine a lone car on a street in the countryside: If a single car just changes pseudonyms there, immediately continuing its broadcasts under the new pseudonym, linkage of the both pseudonyms is trivial for an observer. \\
A crucial parameter of pseudonym schemes has been left out so far: How and when pseudonyms are actually changed. To show why that is so important, let us imagine a lone car on a street in the countryside: If a single car just changes pseudonyms there, immediately continuing its broadcasts under the new pseudonym, linkage of both pseudonyms is trivial for an observer. \\
Another example: Let us look at a traffic jam with 10 cars standing within reception range of an observer. Now there are multiple cars around making the mapping of pseudonyms to cars not totally trivial. But if we assume that each car only changes pseudonyms every 24 hours and does this at an arbitrary time, the probability that only 1 vehicle changes pseudonyms within a short time range is very high, making linkage of pseudonyms easy again. \\
A last example so far: Focusing on one vehicle, let us assume it changes its pseudonym in a perfectly ambiguously way which can't be linked to the old one reliably. But after the pseudonym change, an already enqueued packet is sent, containing identifiers linkable to the previous pseudonyms.
These examples already show important points to take care of when changing pseudonyms: There needs to be some ambiguity regarding which node changed to which pseudonym – there shall be other nodes present within the reception range, coordination and frequency of change matter, and all identifiers need to be changed simultaneously with buffers being flushed or discarded. The position need to be updated during pseudonym change, too, to prevent re-identification through stale position coordinates included in GN packets.
These examples already show important points to take care of when changing pseudonyms: There needs to be some ambiguity regarding which node changed to which pseudonym – there shall be other nodes present within the reception range, coordination and frequency of change matter, and all identifiers need to be changed simultaneously with buffers being flushed or discarded. The position needs to be updated during pseudonym change, too, to prevent re-identification through stale position coordinates included in GN packets.
The \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} working group released gathers a number of concept for pseudonym change strategies in \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITR1032018}: The parameters deciding about a pseudonym change (e.g. time period or way length) shall be randomized to prevent linkability by analyzing the periodicity of changes. After changing pseudonyms, random-length \textit{silent periods} shall be abided in which nodes stop sending any packages. When using a \textit{vehicle-centric} strategy, pseudonym change time, its frequency and duration of silent periods are influenced by the vehicle's mobility and trajectory to make linkage of pseudonyms based on broadcasted movement parameters harder. When using a density-based approach, pseudonyms are changed only if enough other vehicles are around to avoid unnecessary unambiguous pseudonym changes.
The \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} working group gathers a number of concepts for pseudonym change strategies in a technical report \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITR1032018}: The parameters deciding about a pseudonym change (e.g. time period or way length) shall be randomized to prevent linkability by analyzing the periodicity of changes. After changing pseudonyms, random-length \textit{silent periods} shall be abided in which nodes stop sending any packages. When using a \textit{vehicle-centric} strategy, pseudonym change time, its frequency and duration of silent periods are influenced by the vehicle's mobility and trajectory to make linkage of pseudonyms based on broadcasted movement parameters harder. When using a density-based approach, pseudonyms are changed only if enough other vehicles are around to avoid unnecessary unambiguous pseudonym changes.
Mix-zones are geographical areas where no messages of location-aware services are exchanged. This concept is supposed to make linkage of in-going and outgoing vehicles from the zone difficult. These zones are especially effective in high-density and high-fluctuation areas like intersections or parking spots. \\
Within these zones, vehicles could collaboratively change pseudonyms by first announcing it via broadcast messages and then changing synchronously. The efficiency of that approach depends heavily on the density of the situation. \\
@ -331,11 +332,11 @@ The \ac{ETSI} standardized pseudonym scheme is one instance of the ones categori
Some approaches covered don't require contact to an external \ac{PKI} for pseudonym refill, but allow pseudonym self-issuance: Armknecht et al. \cite{armknechtCrosslayerPrivacyEnhancement2007} propose the self-issuance of pseudonym certificates with the node's own master keys. Verification of these pseudonyms utilizes zero-knowledge proofs and bilinear pairings while revocation of certificates works via changing the cryptographic system's parameters. \\
Calandriello et al. \cite{calandrielloEfficientRobustPseudonymous2007} combine the classical certificate scheme with \textit{group signature schemes} (see \ref{sec:group-signatures}) for pseudonym generation with individual private keys, and verification with the public common group key.
When it comes to enhancing the privacy of pseudonym resolution, several approaches of further splitting and distributing identity mapping information over several authorities utilizing blind signature schemes or group signature schemes.
When it comes to enhancing the privacy of pseudonym resolution, several approaches of further splitting and distributing identity mapping information over several authorities utilizing blind signature schemes or group signature schemes are mentioned.
The IFAL protocol \cite{verheulIssueFirstActivate} introduces a mechanism tackling the issue of pseudonym refill: Pseudonym certificates can be distributed in big numbers already well in advance, as they are in principal valid in the future, but only if activated with periodically distributed activation codes. This is possible even over bad connections, SMS messages or via broadcasts as the codes are not confidential, but requires more storage space for the unactivated certificates.
The clear advantage of this class of schemes is the applicability for existing \ac{V2X} standards, as all major V2X Specifications use some kind of certificates.
The clear advantage of this class of schemes is the applicability to existing \ac{V2X} standards, as all major V2X Specifications use some kind of certificates.
These certificates have to be included into each message though and their storage and verification requires notable resources. Furthermore is the maintenance of the \ac{PKI} system quite complicated, both regarding infrastructure requirements and legal and organisational frameworks. Because of these disadvantaged, I now take a look at other cryptographic pseudonym schemes.
@ -354,9 +355,9 @@ With the \ac{TA} being involved in deriving the public key, pseudonym refill alw
The idea behind group signature schemes is that all nodes of a group are using the same shared public key for signing their messages, but have individual private keys for creating these signatures. As every group member could have created the signature validated with that shared public key, all nodes of the group are using the same pseudonym and this are anonymous within the anonymity set of the group. Two messages of the same vehicle are not linkable to each other as they're not distinguishable from two messages of different vehicles which are members of the same group.
Groups require a setup, during which the members of the group are determined and individual private keys are assigned to them by the \textit{group leader}. The group manager is an entity that determines the system parameters including the public group key, creates and assigns private keys based on them to members and may revoke pseudonymity for certain members. This role could be assigned to any node of the group but as it allows certain privileged actions the process of group manager election needs to be concisely designed. Proposals include using \acp{RSU} as regional group managers, which makes infrastructure operators even more powerful potential tracking abilities.
Groups require a setup, during which the members of the group are determined and individual private keys are assigned to them by the \textit{group leader}. The group manager is an entity that determines the system parameters including the public group key, creates and assigns private keys based on them to members and may revoke pseudonymity for certain members. This role could be assigned to any node of the group, but as it allows certain privileged actions the process of group manager election needs to be concisely designed. Proposals include using \acp{RSU} as regional group managers, which gives infrastructure operators even more powerful potential tracking abilities.
Pseudonyms are only changed to manage group dynamics, i.e. change of members of the group. Then the group manager generates new system parameters and issues new keys. When this happened already mentioned strategies like silent periods may be used. But individual network interface addresses still need to be unique per node and thus still have to change regularly like in other pseudonym schemes.
Pseudonyms are only changed to manage group dynamics, i.e. change of members of the group. Then the group manager generates new system parameters and issues new keys. When this happens, already mentioned strategies like silent periods may be used. But individual network interface addresses still need to be unique per node and thus still have to change regularly like in other pseudonym schemes.
As an advantage of these schemes, nodes don't have to deal with generating, issuing and storing many pseudonym certificates.
@ -374,7 +375,7 @@ For verification a node has to send the message (or a hash of it, depending on t
Thus symmetric pseudonym signature schemes heavily rely on infrastructure for signature verification and introduce additional delays due to the needed round trips. These issues make them hardly usable in practice.
There are some attempts of getting rid of the issues. The TESLA protocol \cite{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication} for example manages to reduce the infrastructure dependence by revealing previous signature keys using beaconing messages. This approach still suffers from high latency times though.
There are some attempts of getting rid of these issues. The TESLA protocol \cite{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication} for example manages to reduce the infrastructure dependence by revealing previous signature keys using beaconing messages. This approach still suffers from high latency times though.
\section{Evaluation}
\label{sec:evaluation}
@ -384,23 +385,23 @@ This section evaluates the security of the proposed pseudonym schemes with an em
\subsection{Attacker Model}
In a security system for a network so ubiquitous like \ac{ITS} networks will be in our world with omnipresent, we can have a wide range of different adversaries with different capabilities and interests. So let's try to categorize the possibilities:
In a security system for a network so ubiquitous like \ac{ITS} networks will be in our world with omnipresent nodes, users and infrastructure, we can have a wide range of different adversaries with different capabilities and interests. So let's try to categorize the possibilities:
Let's consider the \textbf{reach} of an attacker: Is the attacker limited to a single position, do they have a set of access points or do they even have a nearly global view on the network and their participants? Are they accessing the network over wireless interfaces or are they part of the backbone infrastructure or internet?
We now consider the \textbf{reach} of an attacker: Is the attacker limited to a single position, do they have a set of access points or do they even have a nearly global view on the network and their participants? Are they accessing the network over wireless interfaces or are they part of the backbone infrastructure or internet?
Is the attacker \textbf{active}ly trying to create, forge, block, modify, \dots messages like a \textit{Dolev-Yao adversary} \cite{dolevSecurityPublicKey1983a} or just \textbf{passive}ly eavesdropping?
Is the attacker an \textbf{insider} - i.e. can it successfully authenticate at least with parts of the network – or an \textbf{outsider}?
So let's combine some of these characteristics to common attacker models and take them as a basis for evaluation: \\
Our first attacker is a \textit{multi-point passive outsider}\label{attacker:1} which we then further extend to a \textit{global-point passive outsider}\label{attacker:2}. \\
So let us combine some of these characteristics to common attacker models and take them as a basis for evaluation: \\
Our first attacker is a \textit{multi-point passive outsider}\label{attacker:1} which we then further extend to a \textit{global passive outsider}\label{attacker:2}. \\
For our third attacker we look at the power of \textit{attackers in the infrastructure}\label{attacker:3}.
The trust assumptions of the ETSI ITS security services architecture are layed out in section 6.2.5 of \cite{europeantelecommunicationsstandardsinstituteetsiETSITS1022010}.
\subsection{Resilience against Attacks}
Assuming our attacker is a multi-point passive outsider eavesdropping on the wireless communication and our \ac{ITS} network uses the pseudonym scheme proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standards. \\
I assume our attacker to be a multi-point passive outsider eavesdropping on the wireless communication and our \ac{ITS} network to use the pseudonym scheme proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standards. \\
As all communication to the \ac{AA} and \ac{EA} is securely encrypted, we can't get any information about the exchanged certificates and IDs from the eavesdropped communication to the PKI even if it happens to occur in our range of reception. Assuming that all identifiers are changed simultaneously, we now can only threaten a node's location privacy by managing to link its pseudonyms to each other. \\
The change strategy proposed by the Car-2-Car Communication Consortium defined in \ref{sec:change-strategies} is deliberately designed with our chosen adversary in mind: Way lengths of segments are chosen big enough to prevent a single radio station tracking multiple segments including the pseudonym change itself while the middle-segment change interval time is chosen short enough to prevent multiple stations tracking the same pseudonym at multiple points. So unless the adversary is lucky enough to have enough stations located at the correct points, we don't even need cooperative pseudonym change strategies so far. \\
When it comes to a global passive outsider though, the presence of other nodes and a cooperative pseudonym change strategy are necessary for reducing the linkability of pseudonyms well enough. Cooperative dynamic pseudonym change reduces the probability of correctly linking pseudonyms together with each change and with the number of cooperating vehicles. Silent periods in mix zones even improve the improbability as now projecting the last broadcasted trajectory into the the future includes too much entropy to reliably link pseudonyms. As we are dealing with an outsider we can even choose the concept of a cryptographic mix zone to keep safety features working. \\
@ -422,12 +423,12 @@ If an insider active attacker node has access to multiple pseudonyms at once and
Preserving user's privacy through the use of pseudonym schemes is an additional requirement likely to add additional overhead to \ac{ITS} networks. So we need to ask ourselves: Is this additional overhead still reasonable?
As shown in the previous section, frequent psudonym change is needed at least each few minutes to prevent linkability of pseudonyms. This requires all network identifiers to change at the same frequency, too, interrupting existing long-standing connections. Applications either need to tolerate this or adopt countermeasures like the usage of a NEMO mobile IP home agent.
As shown in the previous section, frequent pseudonym change is needed at least each few minutes to prevent linkability of pseudonyms. This requires all network identifiers to change with the same frequency, too, interrupting existing long-standing connections. Applications either need to tolerate this or adopt countermeasures like the usage of a NEMO mobile IP home agent.
\cite{RFC3963}
To prevent old identifiers being sent after pseudonym changes in packets already queued before the pseudonym change it is recommended to flush or drop all packet buffers before the change. This isn't necessary if one can be sure that there is no node identifying data in the queued packets. That is true for the \ac{GN} packet forwarding queue, as nodes don't add their own source address when forwarding packages. The same is true for \ac{LS} packets. The source address included in their is the address of the original requesting node and though gives no reliable information about the address of the packet's sender as that node can also just be forwarding the package.
To prevent old identifiers being sent after pseudonym changes in packets already queued before the pseudonym change it is recommended to flush or drop all packet buffers before the change. This isn't necessary if one can be sure that there is no node identifying data in the queued packets. That is true for the \ac{GN} packet forwarding queue, as nodes don't add their own source address when forwarding packages. The same is true for \ac{LS} packets. The source address included in there is the address of the original requesting node and though gives no reliable information about the address of the packet's sender as that node can also just be forwarding the package.
Active pseudonym certificate revocation turns out quite problematic in pseudonym schemes using asymmetric certificates and a \ac{PKI}: \acp{CRL} or \acp{CTL} can quickly grow so big that they don't propagate through the network in reasonable times. Additionally checking each message against them quickly becomes too much for the limited computational resources of the node. So instead of active revocation, passive revocation by preventing misbehaving nodes from refilling their short-lived pseudonyms is the way to go.
Active pseudonym certificate revocation turns out quite problematic in pseudonym schemes using asymmetric certificates and a \ac{PKI}: \acp{CRL} or \acp{CTL} can quickly grow so big that they don't propagate through the network in reasonable times. Additionally checking each message against them quickly becomes too much for the limited computational resources of the node. So instead of active revocation, passive revocation by preventing misbehaving nodes from refilling their short-lived pseudonyms is the approach to choose.
\section{Summary}
@ -437,7 +438,7 @@ The \acf{ETSI} \acf{ITS} standard architecture contains many identifiers through
To counter this threat for a user's location privacy, various pseudonym schemes have been proposed. The one proposed for usage with the \ac{ETSI} standards uses asymmetric cryptography and a \acf{PKI}, but lacks a proper definition of important aspects like a detailed pseudonym change strategy, pseudonym resolution resilient against authority misuse or the usage of more advanced cryptographic schemes. But combined with technologies from other research the scheme is feasible to protect user privacy against several proposed attackers.
As many advanced cryptographic schemes are not compatible with the standardsproposed by \ac{ETSI} so far, future work should evaluate whether the standard could be changed to utilize some of these more modern approaches to counter current drawbacks.
As many advanced cryptographic schemes are not compatible with the standards proposed by \ac{ETSI} so far, future work should evaluate whether the standard could be changed to utilize some of these more modern approaches to counter current drawbacks.
\section{Glossary}