some minor talk flow additions

This commit is contained in:
Trolli Schmittlauch 2018-07-16 20:06:48 +02:00
parent 0c8bab366c
commit 8c51a23764
3 changed files with 76 additions and 5 deletions

Binary file not shown.

View file

@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ communication}
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{E}uropean \textbf{T}elecommunications \textbf{S}tandards \textbf{I}nstitute \item \textbf{E}uropean \textbf{T}elecommunications \textbf{S}tandards \textbf{I}nstitute
\item network technologies used in middle layers: \item this survey: focus on network technologies used in middle layers:
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item GeoNetworking for geographical routing \item GeoNetworking for geographical routing
\item BTP as transport protocol \item BTP as transport protocol
@ -202,7 +202,6 @@ communication}
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item problem: constant communication allows tracking of vehicles \item problem: constant communication allows tracking of vehicles
\item \textit{linkability} of messages threat to \textit{location privacy} \item \textit{linkability} of messages threat to \textit{location privacy}
\item this survey: focus on middle network layers
\item linkable identifiers in messages: \item linkable identifiers in messages:
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item vehicle position \item vehicle position
@ -249,11 +248,11 @@ communication}
\item other nodes present for ambiguity \item other nodes present for ambiguity
\item coordinated change \item coordinated change
\item random change frequency \item random change frequency
\item all identifiers changed simulataneously, buffers flushed \item all identifiers changed simultaneously, buffers flushed
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
\item Car-2-Car CC: divide trips into 3 segments \item Car-2-Car CC: divide trips into 3 segments
\item Mix Zones
\item Silent Periods \item Silent Periods
\item Mix Zones
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
\end{frame} \end{frame}
@ -350,7 +349,7 @@ communication}
\begin{frame} \begin{frame}
\center\huge{Thank you for your attention} \center\huge{Thank you for your attention!}
\includegraphics[height=0.5\textheight]{figures/nomnompingu.png}\tiny\footnote{CC-BY-SA 3.0 by Elektroll} \includegraphics[height=0.5\textheight]{figures/nomnompingu.png}\tiny\footnote{CC-BY-SA 3.0 by Elektroll}

72
talk_notes.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
% notes ITS talk
- quite a long title, so let's 1st talk about ITS before we get to the Pseudonym Schemes
## ITS
- road traffic is still dangerous part of our everyday lives
- infrastructure assist safety
- recent years: decrease of traffic deaths
- probably also thanks to assistance systems
- currently working on their own
- collaboration, proactively broadcast, communicate
- multiple standardization groups working on it
- survey focuses on middle layers
- GN: geograhical ad-hoc routing, broadcast unicast multicast
- constant communication, linkability
- location privacy: deriving location patterns of a single user
- authorized senders: message signing
## pseudonym schemes
- proposed solution: pseudonyms
- must not be linkable
- we only want authorized vehicles to communicate
- a priori trusted: RootCA
- EA knows vehicle ID & public key
- AA trusts valid EA certificates
- pseudonym resolution: desirable for law enforcement agencies
## pseudonym change
- many strategies have been proposed
- C2C CC: statistical values:
- shall achieve that locations significant to a user can't be linked together nor to the user
- 0.8-1.5km, then each 0.8km or 2-6min
- vehicle-centric change strategies: depending on mobility, trajectory
- density-based
- cryptographic mix zones: symm. key from RSU
- safety of collision avoidance systems
### advanced schemes
- identity-based:
- advantage: no certificates needed as ID = key
- disadvantage: splitting mapping information hard, Trusted Authority involved in key derivation
- group signature:
- all members of group can sign for same public key
- problems: group leader, group change -> re-setup of all group keys
- symmetric MACs:
- less computation overhead
- but not really practically usable, as signature checking is done by 3rd parties
## attacker model
- single-point:
- communication with EA and AA encrypted, C2C 3 segments (reception range)
- no cooperative change needed
- global passive:
- cooperative change
- cryptographic mix zones sufficient
- active: pseudonym depeltion
- active insider:
- real silent periods needed, crypto mix zones don't work anymore
- servers in the internet can't link IPv6 address thanks to stateless autoconfiguration
- special attacks:
- pseudonym depletion attack
- sybil attack
- privileged: accountability, resolution
- needs independent judicial systems and separation of powers