some minor talk flow additions
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talk-slides.pdf
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talk-slides.pdf
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@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ communication}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{E}uropean \textbf{T}elecommunications \textbf{S}tandards \textbf{I}nstitute
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\item network technologies used in middle layers:
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\item this survey: focus on network technologies used in middle layers:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item GeoNetworking for geographical routing
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\item BTP as transport protocol
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@ -202,7 +202,6 @@ communication}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item problem: constant communication allows tracking of vehicles
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\item \textit{linkability} of messages threat to \textit{location privacy}
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\item this survey: focus on middle network layers
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\item linkable identifiers in messages:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item vehicle position
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@ -249,11 +248,11 @@ communication}
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\item other nodes present for ambiguity
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\item coordinated change
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\item random change frequency
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\item all identifiers changed simulataneously, buffers flushed
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\item all identifiers changed simultaneously, buffers flushed
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\end{itemize}
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\item Car-2-Car CC: divide trips into 3 segments
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\item Mix Zones
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\item Silent Periods
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\item Mix Zones
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}
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@ -350,7 +349,7 @@ communication}
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\begin{frame}
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\center\huge{Thank you for your attention}
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\center\huge{Thank you for your attention!}
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\includegraphics[height=0.5\textheight]{figures/nomnompingu.png}\tiny\footnote{CC-BY-SA 3.0 by Elektroll}
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72
talk_notes.md
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72
talk_notes.md
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% notes ITS talk
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- quite a long title, so let's 1st talk about ITS before we get to the Pseudonym Schemes
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## ITS
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- road traffic is still dangerous part of our everyday lives
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- infrastructure assist safety
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- recent years: decrease of traffic deaths
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- probably also thanks to assistance systems
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- currently working on their own
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- collaboration, proactively broadcast, communicate
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- multiple standardization groups working on it
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- survey focuses on middle layers
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- GN: geograhical ad-hoc routing, broadcast unicast multicast
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- constant communication, linkability
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- location privacy: deriving location patterns of a single user
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- authorized senders: message signing
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## pseudonym schemes
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- proposed solution: pseudonyms
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- must not be linkable
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- we only want authorized vehicles to communicate
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- a priori trusted: RootCA
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- EA knows vehicle ID & public key
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- AA trusts valid EA certificates
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- pseudonym resolution: desirable for law enforcement agencies
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## pseudonym change
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- many strategies have been proposed
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- C2C CC: statistical values:
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- shall achieve that locations significant to a user can't be linked together nor to the user
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- 0.8-1.5km, then each 0.8km or 2-6min
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- vehicle-centric change strategies: depending on mobility, trajectory
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- density-based
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- cryptographic mix zones: symm. key from RSU
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- safety of collision avoidance systems
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### advanced schemes
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- identity-based:
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- advantage: no certificates needed as ID = key
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- disadvantage: splitting mapping information hard, Trusted Authority involved in key derivation
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- group signature:
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- all members of group can sign for same public key
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- problems: group leader, group change -> re-setup of all group keys
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- symmetric MACs:
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- less computation overhead
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- but not really practically usable, as signature checking is done by 3rd parties
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## attacker model
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- single-point:
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- communication with EA and AA encrypted, C2C 3 segments (reception range)
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- no cooperative change needed
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- global passive:
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- cooperative change
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- cryptographic mix zones sufficient
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- active: pseudonym depeltion
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- active insider:
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- real silent periods needed, crypto mix zones don't work anymore
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- servers in the internet can't link IPv6 address thanks to stateless autoconfiguration
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- special attacks:
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- pseudonym depletion attack
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- sybil attack
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- privileged: accountability, resolution
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- needs independent judicial systems and separation of powers
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