add introduction

glossary.tex

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 \acro{GVL}{Geographical Virtual Link}
 \acro{HSM}{Hardware Security Module}: a dedicated piece of hardware providing strictly regulated access to cryptographic operations based on stored data (e.g. keys)
 \acro{IPv6}{Internet Protocol version 6}
-\acro{ITS}{Intelligent Transportation Systems}
+\acro{ITS}{Intelligent Transportation System}
 \acro{LLC}{Logical Link Control}
 \acro{LS}{GeoNetworking Location Service}
 \acro{LT}{GeoNetworking Location Table}

main.tex

@@ -103,44 +103,22 @@ Networks, Intelligent transportation systems, Security, Mesh networks, Privacy
 
 \section{Introduction}
 
-% % % 
+\IEEEPARstart{I}{n} recent
-% Broad Topic
+years, traffic got safer and safer. Improved safety technologies in our vehicles have contributed a lot to that development. But so far safety assistant systems are mostly working on their own while trying to evaluate the situation around them.  \\
-\Hide{Broad Topic, potentially little broad background}
+\aclp{ITS} aim to create an ecosystem of networked vehicles and their infrastructure, collaborating with other vehicles and road infrastructure to improve safety and additionally providing new services to users.  This step will be crucial for achieving the \textit{vision zero} of no death caused by traffic worldwide.
 
-% \IEEEPARstart{F}{irst} word
+While being an important step for traffic safety, \ac{ITS} can pose a danger for user's privacy as always connected vehicles sending their positional data around in computer networks might allow tracking the users and creating location profiles.  \\
+Multiple solutions have been proposed so far to tackle this issue, protecting the human right of privacy.
+There also already are some surveys giving an overview about the usage of different \textit{pseudonym schemes} for preserving privacy in \acp{ITS}.  But ofthen the cutting-edge research is far ahead of standardization attempts,  while the latter are deciding how future practical implementations might work while the former can provide valuable inspirations and introduce new technologies to the stack.
 
+This survey combines the current status of the European standardization efforts for \acp{ITS} by the \ac{ETSI} with state-of-the-art approaches from newer research.
+Thereby it takes a look at how the middle layers of the \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} standard architecture are affected by the threat against privacy and what can be done about this.
 
-% % % 
+In section \ref{sec:background} I describe the background knowledge needed to judge the functionality of \ac{ETSI} \ac{ITS} networks by giving an overview of their architecture. Afterwards I describe the protocols involved in the middle layers of the networking stack and single out potential identifiers usable for tracking of users.
-% Thema, special problem we're looking at, motivation
-% pbly more background for our problem (why is it actually hard?) 
-% Broad background, general definitions
-\Hide{Topic, some background}
 
-% % % 
+In section \ref{sec:schemes} I describe the pseudonym scheme proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standard, emphasize the importance of pseudonym change strategies and present some further cutting edge pseudonym schemes not covered by standards so far.
-% our goal and our claims (what are we solving in this work?)
-\Hide{Our goal, research question, motivation and relevance (Why is it a problem the reader should care about? Why is it hard?)}
-% % % 
-% Requirements for our solution
-\Hide{Requirements for a good solution}
-% % % 
-% Which metrics can we use to show the quality/quantity of our solution?
-% pbly rough definition of metrics
-\Hide{Metrics to measure how good a solution is}
 
-\Hide{\{If space missing the related work may be presented in a paragraph here\}}
+Section \ref{sec:evaluation} defines attacker models, uses them to evaluate the privacy gained by the \ac{ETSI} pseudonym scheme and looks at the feasability of that approach from a performance perspective.
-
-% % % 
-% Summary of our solution
-\Hide{Overview of our solution and first confidence (how do we show that it's good?)}
-
-\Hide{Our contributions in this paper}
-
-% % % 
-% outline of the paper / reader's digest
-\Hide{Reader's digest}
-
-- I look only at middle layers \\
-- look at ETSI ITS
 
 % % % 
 % Literature Survey and Background
@@ -278,6 +256,7 @@ The Facilities layer introduces a \textit{StationID}, an integer identifying the
 Some further identifiers might be introduced in real-world implementations, e.g. for realising certain service over their dedicated protocols.
 
 \section{Pseudonym Schemes}
+\label{sec:schemes}
 
 As shown in the previous section, \ac{ITS} communication contains many identifiers potentially allowing linking vehicle communication even over longer periods of time and thus track and create movement profiles of vehicles.
 
@@ -394,6 +373,7 @@ Thus symmetric pseudonym signature schemes heavily rely on infrastructure for si
 There are some attempts of getting rid of the issues.  The TESLA protocol \cite{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication} for example manages to reduce the infrastructure dependence by revealing previous signature keys using beaconing messages.  This approach still suffers from high latency times though.
 
 \section{Evaluation}
+\label{sec:evaluation}
 
 This section evaluates the security of the proposed pseudonym schemes with an emphasis on the goals of privacy and anonymity, and the pseudonym schemes proposed in the \ac{ETSI} standards.  I also look at how much the pseudonym schemes influence the general functionality of the \ac{ITS} system.
 
@@ -452,24 +432,6 @@ The \acf{ETSI} \acf{ITS} standard architecture contains many identifiers through
 To counter this threat for a user's location privacy, various pseudonym schemes have been proposed.  The one proposed for usage with the \ac{ETSI} standards uses asymmetric cryptography and a \acf{PKI}, but lacks a proper definition of important aspects like a detailed pseudonym change strategy, pseudonym resolution resilient against authority misuse or the usage of more advanced cryptographic schemes.  But combined with technologies from other research the scheme is feasible to protect user privacy against several proposed attackers.
 
 As many advanced cryptographic schemes are not compatible with the standardsproposed by \ac{ETSI} so far, future work should evaluate whether the standard could be changed to utilize some of these more modern approaches to counter current drawbacks.
-% % % 
-% Specifications
-
-% % % 
-% Implementation
-
-% % % 
-% Evaluation
-
-% % % 
-% Related work (can be done together with literature survey)
-% STATE HOW THE RELATED WORK RELATES TO YOUR WORK!! (how is it similar, how is it different?)
-% Related work is not your enemy, but gives you ``the shoulders of giants'' you can stand on
-% (and besides: some of the authors might review your paper... ;)
-
-% % % 
-% Further work and conclusion
-
 
 \section{Glossary}